



Islamic Summit—Pakistan, 1974

327.5 91056

PAK



Brief for the Pakistan Delegation

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN

ISLAMABAD

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART ONE

	PAGES
SUMMARY FOR THE PRIME MINISTER ..	2—22
List of Appendices :	
Appendix I	23-24
Appendix II	25—28
Appendix III	29-30
Appendix IV	31

PART TWO

Position Papers on :

1. Overall situation in the Middle East	35—42
2. Withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territories	43—63
3. The Palestine Problem	64—81
4. Jerusalem	82—100
5. The Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East	101—117
6. Possible Areas of Economic Cooperation in the Islamic World..	118—121
7. Islamic Development Bank	122—124
8. Cooperation in the Scientific Field	125—129
9. The question of Filipino Muslims	130—136

List of Annexures :

ANNEXURE I	U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22 1967	137
ANNEXURE II	U.N. Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22 1973	138
ANNEXURE III	Map appearing in Christian Science Monitor of November 28 1973	139
ANNEXURE IV	Security Council Resolution No. 237 (1967) of June 14 1967 calling on Israel to respect human rights in areas affected by the 1967 Middle East conflict	141

	PAGES
ANNEXURE V	General Assembly Resolution 2253 (ES-V) of July 4 1967 calling upon Israel to rescind and desist from measures to change the status of Jerusalem 142
ANNEXURE VI	Security Council Resolution No. 252 (1968) of May 21 1968 calling on Israel to rescind all measures to change the status of Jerusalem .. 143
ANNEXURE VII	Security Council Resolution No. 271 (1969) of September 15 1969 noting the universal outrage at the desecration of the al Aqsa Mosque and calling on Israel to rescind all measures to change the status of Jerusalem 144-145
ANNEXURE VIII	General Assembly Resolution No. 2672, A,B,C,D (XXV) of December 8 1970 recognising that the people of Palestine are entitled to self-determination and calling once more on Israel to take immediate steps for the return of the displaced persons 146-149
ANNEXURE IX	Security Council Resolution No. 298 (1971) of September 25 1971 deploring the failure of Israel to respect U.N. resolutions concerning measures to change the status of Jerusalem 150
ANNEXURE X	General Assembly Resolution No. 2949 (XXVII) of December 8 1972 expressing grave concern at the continuation of Israeli occupation of Arab territories and calling upon all states not to recognise changes carried out by Israel in the occupied Arab territories and to avoid actions, including aid, that could constitute recognition of that occupation 151-152
ANNEXURE XI	Security Council Resolution No. 339 (1973) of October 23 1973 153
ANNEXURE XII	Security Council Resolution No. 340 (1973) of October 25 1973 154
ANNEXURE XIII	Security Council Resolution No. 344 (1973) of December 15 1973 155

General Assembly Resolution No. 10 (1957) of
 July 1957 which was passed in order to
 amend the constitution of the Punjab

Assembly

General Assembly Resolution No. 11 (1957) of
 July 1957 which was passed in order to
 amend the constitution of the Punjab

Assembly

General Assembly Resolution No. 12 (1957) of
 July 1957 which was passed in order to
 amend the constitution of the Punjab

Assembly

General Assembly Resolution No. 13 (1957) of
 July 1957 which was passed in order to
 amend the constitution of the Punjab

Assembly

PART ONE

General Assembly Resolution No. 14 (1957) of
 July 1957 which was passed in order to
 amend the constitution of the Punjab

Assembly



SECRET

GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SUMMARY FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

SUBJECT:—*Conference Brief for the Pakistan Delegation to the Second Islamic Summit in Lahore.*

The Second Islamic Summit will convene in Lahore on 22 February, 1974. The final list of countries and Organizations which will attend the Summit will be submitted separately.

PROGRAMME OF MEETINGS

2. The Summit will be preceded by a Preparatory Meeting of Senior Officials on 18 February to be followed by a Conference of Foreign Ministers on 19-20 February. The next day will be left free to enable Foreign Ministers to receive their Heads of State and Government. The Summit will open in the afternoon of 22 February and is expected to close by the night of 24 February. A tentative outline of the programme of meetings is at Appendix I.

ADOPTION OF AGENDA AND ORGANIZATION OF WORK

3. The agenda of the Summit will be initially discussed by the Preparatory Meeting of Senior Officials and finalized by the Conference of Foreign Ministers. Since the Summit has been convened primarily to consider the Middle East situation and the status of Jerusalem, these items will naturally be included in the agenda. Besides, the following items may possibly be suggested for inclusion in the agenda or figure in private or informal discussions;

- (1) The energy crisis.
- (2) Economic cooperation among the Muslim countries;
- (3) Filipino Muslims.

4. It is recommended that the Pakistan delegation not take the lead in proposing the inclusion of any of the above items apart from the Middle East situation and the question of Jerusalem. Instead, Delegations may be informally sounded about including the oil crisis and economic cooperation between Muslim countries on the Summit's agenda. We may try to avoid inclusion of administrative or other matters in view of the brief duration of the Conference and the time that will be needed to evolve a consensus on the principal items for the Final Declaration.

5. At the preparatory meeting of senior officials the Pakistan delegation will circulate a Working Paper on the organization of the Conference of Foreign Ministers and the Summit Session. A copy of this paper is at Appendix II. The paper *inter alia* suggests the issues on which recommendations might be made by the preparatory meeting to the Foreign Ministers. These would include the rules of procedure, election of office-bearers etc. It is envisaged that in accordance with tradition the leader of the delegation of the host country *i.e.* the Prime Minister will be elected to preside over the deliberations of the Summit.

THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

6. The realities in the Middle East have changed fundamentally in recent months. The war of October 1973, even if it is considered a military stalemate, has given an unprecedented fillip to Arab morale and confidence. Together with the impact of the concerted Arab oil strategy, this has impressed upon those countries such as the United States, Japan etc., which were hitherto apathetic in their attitude towards the situation, that the Middle East dispute must be resolved in a manner acceptable to the Arab countries. However, it remains to be seen to what extent Israel's attitude has been chastened by the October war. Under the prodding of the United States, it has made certain gestures of accommodation *e.g.* the disengagement agreement signed between Egypt and Israel on 18 January 1974. But this is only a preliminary step. Negotiations on the terms of a peace settlement have yet to begin. An

encouraging portent has been a recognition by the two Super Powers of the fact that without a peace settlement between Israel and Arabs, *detente* between them would be under strain and subject to the threat of confrontation.

7. It is only to be expected that a settlement which is both just and acceptable to all the parties, will be difficult to achieve. Besides the complexity of the issues and the emotional reactions they produce on both sides, the Arab States are not completely at one on the objectives to be pursued and the means by which these can be achieved. Also, the interests and intrigues of the Super-Powers cannot be disregarded. A detailed position paper on the overall Middle East situation is placed below.

8. Pakistan has a historical involvement with the Middle East dispute primarily because of the strong cultural and religious ties with the area. The Arab-Israeli conflict and especially the future of Jerusalem have impelled the Arab and Muslim countries towards greater efforts to concert their policies and positions. The ideal of Islamic unity has been a constant goal of the people of Pakistan. So far it has not been given real substance beyond expressions of solidarity and mutual support. Islamic unity can, however, take concrete shape today because the Muslim States together possess the resources, people and power to make them a decisive force.

9. The main objective of the Pakistan delegation at the Lahore Summit should be to promote the cohesion of the Islamic countries. The most convincing evidence of this would be the degree of unanimity they can achieve on the substantive aspects and modalities of a peace settlement in the Middle East.

10. The main elements of the Middle East situation on which the Summit may be called upon to pronounce itself are : withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied Arab territories, the restoration of the rights of the Palestinians, the question of Jerusalem and the prospects for the Geneva Peace Talks.

(A) *Withdrawal from Arab occupied territories*

11. After the 1967 war, the question of Israeli withdrawals from Arab territories has been the central issue in the Middle East dispute. The Arab countries, basing themselves on the principle of non-acquisition of territory by force and the provision for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories contained in resolution 242 of the Security Council, have insisted on evacuation of all their territories occupied by Israel since 5 June, 1967. Israel, on the other hand, has held that the stipulation regarding "secure and recognised boundaries" obliges it only to withdraw to the borders to be determined in a negotiated settlement. These differences on the substance and as well as procedures of a settlement (whether through face to face talks or an intermediary) have obstructed all the initiatives undertaken since 1967 to bring about a peaceful settlement.

12. The recent Arab Summit in Algiers has reiterated the call for Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories. Nevertheless, it is believed, that a secret understanding was reached among the big-four *i.e.* Sadaat, Assad, Faisal and Boumedienne, that while the return of Jerusalem was non-negotiable, minor modifications in other sectors were possible.

13. There are also differences among the Arabs as to the priority to be accorded to the achievement of their 2 main objectives : Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and restitution of Palestinian rights. While countries such as Algeria, Libya and others place primary importance on the need to restore the 'national' rights of the Palestinian people, Egypt is most anxious to retrieve its lost territories and perhaps to reach a *modus vivendi* with Israel. Syria, the other front line country, upholds the importance of resolving the Palestinian issue, but may also be ready to acquiesce in a territorial settlement as a matter of priority if Israel withdraws from the Golan Heights under some demilitarization arrangements. Jordan's anxiety is first of all to establish its right to have the West Bank returned to it and for the purpose is willing to agree to minor modifications in the pre-1967 lines with

Israel. However, until the dispute between Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization as to which of them should exercise authority over the West Bank on behalf of the Palestinian people is resolved, no effective pressure can be brought to bear on Israel to withdraw from the West Bank. In fact, Jordan itself may not be averse to colluding with the Israelis in regard to this territory if the prospects of the PLO being conceded its claim were to become favourable.

14. Pakistan is, of course, not directly concerned with the shape of a final territorial settlement in the Middle East. Our stand on this question has been based on the principle of non-acquisition of territory by the use of force. The application or otherwise of this principle is of direct importance to Pakistan in the context of its relations with its neighbours. The Pakistan delegation should therefore continue to support the demand for Israeli withdrawals from all the territories it has occupied since 1967. However, it is most likely that the differences among the Arab countries, and between them and other Muslim countries, on the question of Israeli withdrawals will be aired during the Summit. The Pakistan delegation should seek to adhere to the mainstream of Arab opinion. To begin with, the delegation should refrain from direct or detailed reference to the issues on which differences exist. After these have been voiced, the delegation could attempt to promote conciliation in the form of an agreed statement on the question for inclusion in the final Declaration. A tentative draft of a possible compromise is attached at Appendix III. A detailed position paper on the question of Israeli withdrawals from occupied territories is placed below.

(B) The Palestine Question

15. It is now generally recognised that no solution of the Middle East dispute can be durable unless it redresses the grievances of the people of Palestine. In resolution 194 (III) the General Assembly had recognised the right of the Palestinian people either to be restored to their homes in what is Israel, or to

be adequately recompensed. So far Israel has shown no serious intention of doing either. Also the Arab countries in which the Palestinians have sought refuge, have by and large, discouraged their integration into their own societies partly in order to keep the Palestinian issue alive.

16. The Arab defeat in 1967 was a grievous blow to the cause of the Palestinians since it diverted attention from their plight to the question of obtaining the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Arab occupied territories. Resolution 242 of the Security Council referred only to the necessity of resolving the "refugee problem" and that too as an issue secondary to withdrawal from occupied territories and the mutual recognition of the right of all the states in the area to live in peace within "secure and recognised boundaries". In fact for the Palestinians, this last provision, which implied Arab recognition of Israel, undermined the very basis of their case for the creation of a unified and secular Palestinian state comprising of both Arabs and Jews.

17. Their very desperation, however, gave an impetus to the organization of an armed and militant Palestinian resistance movement. The most prominent among these movements is the Palestine Liberation Organization—a federation of a number of smaller groups—under the leadership of Yasser Arafat.

18. The guerrilla struggle was initially successful in creating tension and insecurity in Israel and the occupied territories. Israel, however, retaliated by punitive expeditions against the Palestinian bases in Jordan and Lebanon, and did not hesitate to engage the forces of these countries as well. Their Governments, especially Jordan, attempted to control the guerrilla movement initially without much success. In September 1970, however, King Hussein ruthlessly suppressed the Palestinian organizations obliging a large number of the commandos to seek refuge in Syria or Lebanon. The Lebanese-Palestinian relationship has also been uneasy.

19. The determination of the Palestinians has, however, paid dividends. The Arab States, and even the major powers, now readily acknowledge that the resolution of the Palestinian problem is necessary for peace in the Middle East.

20. Also, an avenue may have been found to reconcile the inconsistency between the Palestinian objectives and the reality of Israel, which most Arabs agree cannot be destroyed for the present at least. The proposed solution being pressed on the Palestinians by the Soviet Union and Egypt is to create a separate state for themselves on the West Bank. This alternative appears to have been accepted by most Arab States, except Libya, which still insists on the liquidation of the Zionist State, and Jordan, which feels that whether the Palestinians wish to create a separate state should be determined through a plebiscite after Israel returns the West Bank to Jordan. The recognition by the Arab Summit of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people is relevant in the context of the Jordan-PLO dispute over the West Bank.

21. Yet, the Palestinians are themselves divided on whether to accept a truncated Palestinian State on the West Bank and thus compromise their objective of liberating all of Palestine. Yasser Arafat is under considerable pressure especially from the Soviet Union to form a government-in-exile and participate in the Geneva Talks.

22. Pakistan had opposed the creation of Israel. It has, on the basis of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), consistently upheld the right of the Palestinians to return to their homes or be paid adequate compensation. However, our support for the Palestinian resistance has been muted. Moreover, in the eyes of the Palestinians, Pakistan has been very closely identified with King Hussein of Jordan. In recent months Pakistan has moved progressively away from this one sided posture. Our military assistance to Jordan has been reduced. We have allowed the PLO to open an office in Pakistan, although we have not recognised it as the

sole representative of the Palestinian people. We have agreed to accord to Yasser Arafat the honours due to a Head of a State when he arrives for the Summit. At the same time, Pakistan has maintained close relations with King Hussein of Jordan.

23. During the Summit, Pakistan should declare its support for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, without in the first instance elaborating what this implies. It is, however, more than likely that the PLO and its champions will propose that it be recognised as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. There may also be some discussion perhaps in the closed sessions about the creation of a Palestinian Government in exile. On these issues, Jordan may not find itself as isolated as at the Arab Summit in Algiers. Pakistan should not become embroiled in this controversy. Our tactics should be to allow the two sides to ventilate their views and then to work quietly for a conciliation between the parties. In doing so, the Pakistan delegation can emphasize that unless agreement is reached on this question it will be very difficult to secure Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank. In case, however, a confrontation on this issue cannot be avoided, Pakistan should go along with the mainstream of Arab opinion in the support of the position of the PLO. A detailed Position Paper on the Palestine Question is placed below.

(C) *Jerusalem*

24. In the 1948 war, half the Holy City was lost to Israel; in 1967, Israel occupied East Jerusalem as well. The importance of Jerusalem cannot be measured in purely strategic, political or economic terms. The loss of Muslim control over the City after a period of 1300 years is a highly emotive issue not only in the Arab countries but in the entire Muslim world. In fact, the First Islamic Summit was called in the wake of the act of arson in the Holy Al-Aqsa Mosque to consider the question of Jerusalem.

25. The Arab and Islamic countries have argued for the return of Jerusalem to its pre-1967 status. Israel on the other hand has

been equally adamant in its refusal to vacate any part of it. Various ideas have been put forward from time to time to find a solution. These include : Israeli control of Jerusalem but with Muslim access to their Holy Places, functional internationalisation under Israeli or joint Israeli-Arab control, Vatican status, territorial internationalisation or return to pre-1967 status.

26. The Arab Summit in Algiers underlined that Israel must withdraw from all occupied territories and first of all from Jerusalem. This was declared to be a "paramount and unchangeable" condition for Middle East peace. The declaration reflected the resolute attitude of King Faisal on the issue.

27. At the Islamic Summit, the Pakistan delegation should seek to obtain agreement on a strong statement demanding Israeli withdrawal from Jerusalem. This would not only please King Faisal and the other Arab countries, but may also improve the possibilities for Egypt and Syria to obtain concessions from Israel on withdrawals from their territories. Such a declaration will also be expected by public opinion in Pakistan.

28. Jerusalem is the one issue on which Pakistan can safely take an initiative without the danger of offending any of the Arab countries. It is, therefore, proposed that Pakistan should circulate a specific resolution on Jerusalem at the Preparatory meeting of Senior Officials for consideration by Foreign Ministers and adoption by the Summit. Such a resolution would be based on the decisions of the previous Islamic Conferences and the Arab Summit in Algiers. A draft of this Resolution is submitted at Appendix IV. A detailed Position Paper on Jerusalem is placed below.

(D) *The Geneva Peace Conference*

29. The Geneva Peace Conference represents the first occasion on which some of the front line countries have agreed to enter into direct and formal negotiations with Israel. Egypt's agreement to participate was secured by the assurances it received from both the Super Powers that Egyptian territory would be vacated. Once

Egypt agreed, Jordan had small cause to feel inhibited about participating in the talks. The different interpretations of resolution 242 held by the two sides were overcome by committing Israel (and the Super-Powers), to implementation of the resolution, which was the Egyptian view, and at the same time calling upon the parties to begin negotiations, under appropriate auspices, for a peace settlement, thereby meeting the Israeli demand for direct negotiations.

30. The Egyptian agreement to participate was accepted by the Arab Summit in Algiers though not without some trepidation on the part of those who believe that the outcome would seriously compromise the position of the Arabs on territorial withdrawals and Palestinian 'national' rights. Syria's hesitancy in attending may have been the outcome of such fears.

31. The one substantial achievement of the Conference so far has been the disengagement agreement reached between Egypt and Israel. The difficulties experienced in arriving at even this limited and preliminary agreement is indicative of the arduous task ahead of the Conference.

32. It is possible that some agreement may be reached on withdrawals from the Sinai. In regard to the Golan Heights, the Israeli Prime Minister's recent stand that the Golan Heights is part of Israel and that it will build its first city there darkens the prospects of any Israeli withdrawal from that occupied area of Syria. Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank will, however, be no less difficult to secure because it is at present claimed by two Arab parties, Jordan and the P.L.O., thereby minimising the pressure on Israel to withdraw. Withdrawal from the West Bank is also interlinked with the much more difficult issue of restoring the 'national' rights of the Palestinians. First, the Palestinians have to decide if they will settle for a separate state on the West Bank, next they must secure Jordan's assent to this and finally convince the Israelis of their peaceful intentions were it to withdraw.

33. The future of Jerusalem will present the most intractable problem. In view of Israel's adamant stand, the Arab participants

in the Peace Talks will come under pressure to agree to some form of compromise with Israel. For the present, it is difficult to envisage a formula that would be acceptable to all the parties.

34. It is likely that references would be made, both favourable and otherwise, to the advisability of the Arab States participating in the Geneva Peace Conference. Pakistan should merely express the hope that the Geneva Talks will be successful and reiterate that any settlement that may be reached should be in accordance with the principles and resolutions of the United Nations on the various problems under consideration and that a return to the *status quo* ante of no war and no peace would be intolerable. A detailed position paper on the Geneva Peace Conference is placed below.

ENERGY CRISIS

35. The energy crisis has been the most dramatic development in international economic relations in recent years. The crisis is the result of the disproportionate dependence of the world on oil supplies from a handful of producing countries. Until recently, these countries received only a small margin of the profits which the oil companies earned. After efforts extending more than a decade, the producing countries have at long last been able to assert their right to determine the policies on oil production and pricing.

36. The oil crisis has two aspects. The first is the general cutback in production and selective embargoes placed by the Arab oil producing countries in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict. The second is the phenomenal increase in prices which have quadrupled in a little over one year. The Arab oil embargo has been largely ineffective because the distribution of oil is still controlled by the Oil Companies. It is also unclear as to what extent the Arabs reduced their production levels. Some assessments indicate that this may not have been of the declared magnitude. On the other hand, the increase in the price of oil will have a real and devastating impact on the balance of payments

situation of the oil consuming countries whether developing or industrialized. Although the Arabs are commonly thought to have caused the current economic difficulties, it is in fact Iran which has been in the fore-front of the bid to raise oil prices. The Shahanshah of Iran justifies the price increases by referring to the increases in the prices of manufactures and commodities which the oil producing countries have to import.

37. Forecasts about the impact of the energy 'squeeze' and price increases vary from prophecies of doom to scepticism of any real hardship. If present trends in prices and consumption continue, it is likely it would produce a higher rate of inflation and lower rate of increase in output in the developed countries. The net effect would be a situation commonly described as 'stagflation'. The developed countries may, however, be able to recover a substantial portion of their expenditure on oil imports through reinvestment of the oil revenues in their economies and by raising the prices of the manufactured goods and commodities they export. Despite the furore in the United States about the energy crisis, it would, at least in the short run, be the least affected among the developed countries since its oil imports are proportionately less than those of other industrialised nations.

38. However, the anxiety of the United States and other developed countries is not only about the present price of oil but to assure the availability of increasing supplies at stable rates to maintain their economic growth. Zero growth for the developed countries would mean serious dislocations in their entire socio-economic structures. The United States is concerned that, because of its present differences with the Arab countries, it will be preempted from obtaining an assured supply of oil in the coming years. This is why the United States has expressed displeasure at the various bilateral deals being made by the other industrialized countries with the Middle East oil producers, while it is still officially under the Arab embargo. The United States has attempted to promote the idea of an oil consumers association to concert policy towards the oil producing countries. The real aims of the U.S.

move can only be conjectured but may include a 'rollback' in prices, assured supplies, reinvestment of oil revenues to finance balance of payments deficits etc. The U.S. also appears to have contemplated economic and even military retaliation against the Arabs. Significantly, the onus for the difficulties are placed on the Arabs, and Iran's role in obtaining the price-hike is being played down. The United States is also engaged in a transparent effort to turn opinion in the developing countries against the Arab oil producing nations by pointing to the grave impact of the oil crisis on these countries.

39. The developing countries are, indeed, in a difficult predicament. Their cost of oil imports in 1973 was about \$5.2 billion. This will increase in 1974 to \$14.9 billion. This increased expenditure would then wipe out the present level of grants and net public capital flows to these countries. The increase in the price of oil would affect all the sectors of their economies. Moreover, in case there is a recession in the Western economies it would decrease the demand for the goods which the developing countries export and, as apparent in the rejection by the U.S. House of Representatives of the IDA replenishment, may also seriously affect the flow of development assistance to the Third World.

40. So far the developing countries have made no serious attempt to adopt a coordinated policy on ways and means to overcome the present economic crisis. Although some references have been made to their plight in certain multilateral forums, the developing countries have been generally inhibited from proposing any urgent action because of their political relations with the oil producing countries and the obvious effort being made to divide the Third World. Also, for many years at the U.N. and other international forums, it has been an article of faith among countries of the Third World that the sovereignty of a State includes the right to dispose of its own natural resources in whatever manner it deems fit. However, some of the developing countries, prominently India, have been active in attempting to promote bilateral arrangements to assure an adequate supply of oil at favourable

rates. India also appears to favour concerted action by the developing oil consumer countries to obtain concessions from the oil producers.

41. The oil producing countries have made certain gestures to ameliorate the difficulties of the developing countries. The Arab oil producers have agreed to provide \$400 million to African countries through a Development Bank and a Fund. More recently, an OAU Committee secured a promise from Arab oil States for credits to African States to compensate for their loss due to increase in oil prices. Also, Zaire and Zambia will buy oil directly from Algeria and Libya. King Faisal has promised to grant \$200 million to the Sudan. The producing countries, however, have resisted the demand of certain developing countries for a preferential price system. Algeria has proposed that other developing countries follow the example of the oil producers and tie the prices of their raw materials, except food commodities, to the price of the manufactured goods of the developed countries. Algeria has called a special session of the General Assembly to consider this proposal next month. Even if this approach succeeds the benefits would be uneven and insufficient to cover the dimension of the difficulties created for the developing countries by the increased oil prices.

42. The Shahanshah of Iran has also advanced certain ideas *e.g.* the creation of a Bank to provide money to the developing countries on "easy terms"; an International Board which will impartially examine the needs of the developing countries for goods and commodities and place orders for their supply on manufactures; investment in the search for new kinds of energy; investment in the developing countries; provision of surplus foreign exchange to the IMF on commercial terms to finance balance of payments deficits, and purchase of World Bank bonds and other securities, on commercial terms, to enhance developmental activities. The last 2 suggestions would be of little help to the developing countries; the value of the others depends on the magnitude of resources that would be committed. The Shahanshah is thus far ahead of the Arab oil producers in his perception of the potential world wide

resentment among developing countries which are hard-hit by the rise in oil prices, and is therefore moving swiftly to defuse the situation. The Arabs stand in danger of becoming isolated unless they can match the Shahanshah's bid to the developing countries, if not better it.

43. It is as yet unclear as to how much of the increased oil revenues, estimated at \$50 billion for this year, would flow to the developing countries. Unlike the past, the oil producers would wish to invest as much as they can domestically to promote industrialization etc. Some of them, however, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Libya, are either so small or so sparsely populated that they could not possibly absorb more than a fraction of their increased income. Attractive offers are being made to refunnel this money into the developed countries and it is presently assumed that one third of the increased oil revenues would flow back to them in one form or another. Nevertheless, there are political factors such as the possibility of their bank accounts being 'frozen' and economic implications such as the dwindling value of their money because of inflation, which may induce these countries to explore other avenues for usefully employing their wealth. This is the best hope for the developing countries.

44. The developing countries cannot question the sovereign right of the producers to set any price on their commodity and natural resources that they deem to be in their economic interests. For them the problem is one of adjusting to the sharp and sudden increase in oil prices. For instance, Pakistan's oil bill between 1974—80 will increase by \$2.4 billion. Also, the higher oil prices will affect cost structures in all the sectors of their economies. During the Islamic Summit we would be making bilateral approaches to the oil producing countries to ameliorate our difficulties. Recommendations for these bilateral talks are being submitted separately to the Prime Minister. We should concentrate in the main on securing bilateral deals with the oil producing countries to enable us to meet the problems of economic transition

resulting from the abrupt rise in oil prices, and in attracting Arab capital for the development of our agriculture, industry and in stepping up defence production. But if informal soundings elicit favourable reactions to the possibility of collective international action, then and only then alone, should we explore the multilateral approach to a solution of the problems of the Islamic and Third World countries as a whole.

45. The advantages of a discussion in the Conference may be : Agreement on the principle of special treatment for the Islamic and other developing countries would obviously assist us in our bilateral efforts. A consensus statement on the oil crisis would also invest the Summit with added importance and meaning. Finally, it may be politic for the Arabs themselves to defuse the present resentment being built up against them, especially among the developing countries, by making some positive gestures at the Summit.

46. There are many views on how the oil crisis can be resolved. It is recommended that the Pakistan delegation should adhere to the following guidelines :

- (i) refer to the oil crisis in the perspective of world economic relations as signifying the end of the era of exploitation ;
- (ii) support for the right of the oil producing countries to determine prices and levels of production ;
- (iii) the problem is not restricted to energy resources but encompasses the relation between the prices of all the raw materials of developing countries and the prices of manufactured goods of the developed countries. Support the Algerian proposal to convene a special session of the General Assembly to discuss the problem of raw materials and economic development ;
- (iv) the immediate problem for the developing countries is one of adjustment to the new situation and they require

assistance during the transitional phase (of about 7 years) to prevent serious disruption of their development efforts;

- (v) as members of the Third World, the oil producing countries have a special responsibility to assist other developing countries sustain their economic development and to jointly strive for a truly just and equitable system of world economic relations;
- (vi) relief to the developing countries is also necessary to blunt the efforts that are being made to turn these countries against the Arabs;
- (vii) provision of funds to the developing countries would create an increased demand for the goods of the developed countries and the oil producing nations thus ensuring a harmonious recycling of funds.

47. The most beneficial form of short term relief which could be provided to the developing countries is some form of concessionary pricing *e.g.* graduated price increase; a basic price for present quantity of oil imports and market price for additional quantities; full payment of cost element of the price and a rebate-*cum*-deferred price on the tax element. It is, however, unlikely that preferential pricing would be acceptable to the oil producing countries although, bilaterally some of them may agree to sell it to us directly from their 'participation' shares at lower than market rates.

48. It is recommended that apart from preferential prices, the Pakistan delegation should suggest consideration of the following forms of short term assistance :

- (i) massive capital assistance on 'soft' terms *i.e.* 25 to 40 years maturity and 3/4% interest. For this purpose
 - (a) new developmental institutions *e.g.* an OPEC or OAPEC Bank or Fund, could be created;
 - (b) the capital envisaged for the Islamic Development Bank could be

- increased and (c) until these institutions are operational, assistance channelled through the World Bank and IDA, e.g. by making up the \$1.5 billion shortfall in IDA replenishment as a result of U.S. non-participation.
- (ii) long-term credits to developing countries in exchange for export of food surpluses to oil producing countries;
 - (iii) additional issue of Special Drawing Rights under IMF to finance oil imports of developing countries;
 - (iv) joint ventures in 'downstream' activities e.g. petrochemicals, fertilizers, and other industrial sectors.

49. Such measures cannot, however, be expected to provide all the relief required by the developing countries. In the long-term, the only way in which they can hope to sustain a rapid rate of development is through increased economic cooperation especially with the oil producing countries.

ECONOMIC COOPERATION AMONG THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES

50. Most of the Muslim countries are under-developed. Although some of them have very high *per capita* incomes because of their oil wealth, this has so far not been invested in strategic sectors such as industrial and scientific infra-structure, development of technical skills etc. Others are poor although some of them, like Pakistan, are relatively advanced in technology and developmental infra-structure. Most of the Muslim countries have an agricultural base but the majority are not self-sufficient in food.

51. So far, economic cooperation between the Muslim countries has been minimal. Trade amongst them is less than 5% of their total trade. The previous Islamic Conferences, have, by and large, considered specific and peripheral matters relating to economic cooperation. The most tangible outcome of the previous Conferences was the Islamic Development Bank, an idea proposed by Pakistan.

52. There is a vast potential for mutually beneficial cooperation among the Islamic countries. There is need for a concerted policy

to ensure that these countries develop for mutual benefit, complementary and not competitive economic structures. To a substantial extent, they could help to fulfil each others requirements. Unity of purpose and action would also enable these countries to negotiate with the developed countries from a position of strength on the whole range of economic issues.

53. It is recommended that at the Summit, the Pakistan delegation should make the following suggestions to enhance long-term economic cooperation among the Islamic countries;

- (i) utilizing complementarities existing between Muslim countries to establish joint ventures in petro-chemicals, fertilizers, cement, cotton textiles etc;
- (ii) investment for increasing food production in those Muslim countries which are advantageously placed in this regard to supply at favourable rates to others which have a food deficit;
- (iii) increased trade among Muslim countries and deliberate expansion of markets for each other's goods and commodities;
- (iv) an increasing share for Muslim countries in the transport, shipping, banking, insurance and other invisible transactions related to the oil industry;
- (v) utilization of the skills and manpower of Muslim countries for employment in the new industries likely to be established by oil producing countries;
- (vi) creation of cartels (like OPEC) among Muslim and other developing countries for commodities and raw materials (*i.e.* essentially the Algerian proposal).
- (vii) formation of joint positions by the Muslim countries in economic negotiations with the industrialized countries to obtain concessions *e.g.* in the trade and monetary negotiations in GATT and IMF.

54. As the host country, it would not be appropriate for Pakistan to itself initiate the consideration of the energy crisis and economic cooperation. It is recommended that a few delegations of other countries which are also affected by the oil crisis may be informally approached at senior official level to suggest a discussion of the economic situation. If soundings elicit a generally favourable response, the Pakistan delegation could informally circulate a working paper containing the above ideas for discussion among Senior Officials with a view to submitting recommendations to the Foreign Ministers. Inclusion of appropriate paragraphs in the Final Declaration of the Summit will, of course, depend on the outcome of the Foreign Ministers' deliberations. A draft of the working paper on economic cooperation is being submitted separately to the Prime Minister.

THE QUESTION OF FILIPINO MUSLIMS

55. In the middle of 1971, the Muslims in the Philippines, who inhabit the Southern Islands of that country and constitute about 10% of its 40 million people, complained that their lands were being taken away by the Government and given to the Christians. In November 1971, the Islamic Secretariat circulated a note to members of the Islamic Conference stating that the Muslims had been dispossessed of their land by the Christians because of religious animosity. In January 1972, at the invitation of the Philippines Government, a group of Muslim diplomats were taken on a conducted tour of Muslim areas. Although sufficient evidence was not available to substantiate the charges of genocide, it was apparent that the Filipino Muslims were very insecure and mistrustful of the Armed Forces. This question came up for discussion at the Fourth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers which expressed deep concern over the reported repression and mass extermination of Muslims in South Philippines and urged the Philippines Government to halt the campaign of violence and ensure their safety and basic liberties. A 4-man delegation appointed by the Benghazi Conference also visited the affected areas. President Marcos was reported to have openly admitted that there had been neglect on the part of the Government to attend to the welfare of Filipino

Muslims and that he had taken corrective measures in the socio-economic field to ameliorate their condition. The Pope was also approached. He promised to do all that he could in this connection.

56. It appears that an armed insurrection is still underway in the Muslim areas of the Philippines. A few days ago official sources in Manila said that the Southern Philippine town of Jojo had come under mortar attack from "Maoist Muslim rebels", and several civilians were killed or wounded. The Government, however, denied reports that the town had fallen.

57. It is possible that Libya may raise this question at the Summit. It is recommended that we should discourage any extensive discussion. If Libya proposes a specific reference to the Filipino Muslims in the Final Declaration, we may point out to the Libyan delegation and other friendly countries that it would be embarrassing for Pakistan if there was a reference to Filipino Muslims and no mention of the Indian Muslims or the Muslims of Kashmir.


58. A draft of the *Final Declaration* to be adopted by the Summit will be submitted separately.

59. Briefs for the Prime Minister's bilateral discussions are also being submitted separately.

60. The Conference Brief is submitted for the Prime Minister's approval.

A. SHAHI,
Foreign Secretary.

Islamabad, the 15th February, 1974.



ISLAMIC SUMMIT PAKISTAN, 1974

PROGRAMME

PREPARATORY MEETING OF SENIOR OFFICIALS

Sunday 17 February

Senior officials arrive

Monday 18 February

Forenoon Informal consultations.

1300 Lunch by Foreign Secretary

1500	}	Working Session
to		
1900		

CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

Monday 18 February

Foreign Ministers arrive

Tuesday 19 February

1000	}	Closed Session
to		
1300		

1600	}	Closed Session
to		
1900		

2030 Dinner by the Governor of Punjab at Governor's House

Wednesday 20 February

1000	}	Closed Session
to		
1300		

1600	}	Closed Session
to		
1900		

2030 Dinner by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Defence at Intercontinental Hotel.

CONFERENCE OF KINGS, HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT

Thursday 21 February

Heads of State and Government arrive

Friday 22 February

1345 Prayers at Badshahi Mosque

1700 }
to } Opening Session
1930 }

2100 Banquet by the President of Pakistan at Governor's House—Khat-tak Dance

Saturday 23 February

1030 }
to } Closed Session
1230 }

1700 }
to } Closed Session
1930 }

2100 Banquet by the Prime Minister of Pakistan at the Lahore Fort Cultural Soiree

Sunday 24 February

1030 }
to } Closed Session
1230 }

1600 Reception by the Chief Minister of Punjab at Shalimar Gardens.

1800 Closing Session

Monday 25 February

Departures

ORGANISATION OF WORK

NOTE FOR THE PREPARATORY MEETING OF SENIOR OFFICIALS

1. According to the preliminary schedule of the meetings of the three levels of the Islamic Summit, it is expected that the Preparatory Meeting of Senior Officials will be held in the afternoon on 18 February 1974. Prior to the working session, the Senior Officials will, in the forenoon, have an opportunity to meet for informal consultations. The Foreign Ministers are expected to meet on 19 and 20 February, for two sessions each day. The Conference of Kings, Heads of State and Government will be held from 22 to 24 February.

2. Senior Officials may wish to exchange views concerning the organisation, programme of work, agenda and other aspects of the Summit. It may be possible to decide some matters at the level of the Senior Officials. On others they may wish to formulate recommendations for the consideration of, and decision by, the Foreign Ministers.

3. In order to facilitate this task, the Pakistan delegation has prepared this working paper which gives a tentative outline of some of the matters that require consideration and decision.

4. Senior Officials may wish to take a formal decision regarding :

- (i) *Election of Chairman*.—Presiding Officers for the Preparatory Meeting of Senior Officials and for the meetings of Foreign Ministers will have to be designated.
- (ii) *Dates of the three level meetings*.—These dates have been indicated in para 1 above.
- (iii) *Timings of the meetings*.—It is suggested that the Senior Officials meet sometime before lunch on 18 February for informal consultations and convene their Preparatory Meeting from 3.00 P.M. to 7.00 P.M.

The Foreign Ministers may like to convene two meetings each day on 19 and 20 February. The morning session could be from 10.30 a.m. to 1.00 p.m. and the afternoon one from 4.00 p.m. to 7.00 p.m.

The Summit meetings of the Heads of State and Government may commence from the afternoon of 22 February. On account of the Friday prayers, it would be desirable to convene the Opening Session at 4.30 p.m. The session could adjourn at 8.00 p.m.

The next day (23 February), Heads of State and Government may desire to hold two sessions. The morning meeting may be from 10.30 a.m. to 12.30 p.m. and the afternoon meeting from 5.00 p.m. to 7.30 p.m.

On the last day (24 February), there could again be two meetings of the Summit. The morning meeting may be as on the previous day. However, the afternoon meeting, will have to be delayed on account of the Reception planned in honour of the visiting dignitaries. The Closing Session may, therefore, start at 7.00 p.m. As the length of the Closing Session cannot be anticipated, it is suggested that no adjournment time should be fixed for the moment.

(iv) *Nature of Sessions.*—According to past practice, it is suggested that the Preparatory Meeting of Senior Officials and all the meetings of the Foreign Ministers be in closed sessions. It is further suggested that the Opening and Closing Sessions of the Summit may be public because of their ceremonial nature. Other meetings of the Summit deliberations may be closed.

(v) *Rules of Procedure.*—It is suggested that the draft rules of procedure circulated by the Islamic Secretariat, with such amendments as may be deemed appropriate by the Foreign Ministers, may be used provisionally for the conduct of the Summit deliberations.

(vi) *Establishment of Committees/Working or Drafting Groups.*—It may be necessary for a Committee or a Sub-Committee to meet at the same time as the Plenary. In deciding on the number of such Committees, it may be noted that at one given time, conference services have facilities to provide simultaneous interpretation to the Plenary and one main Committee and consecutive interpretation to another Committee. If at that very time it is desired to hold meetings of Working or Drafting Groups of a limited membership, small committee rooms would be available but without interpretation.

(vii) *Record of Proceedings.*—It needs to be determined in advance as to which meetings will have verbatim or summary or no records.

5. Senior Officials may wish to discuss the following and formulate recommendations for the consideration of, and adoption by, the Foreign Ministers :

(i) *Agenda for the Summit.*—Official notification by the Secretary-General of the Islamic Secretariat has indicated that the Heads of State and Government will primarily deal with the situation in the Middle East and the restoration of Muslim rights over the Holy City of Jerusalem.

Foreign Ministers will need to decide what other issues may be deliberated by the Heads of State and Government.

- (ii) *Spokesman of the Summit.*—In conformity with past practice Foreign Ministers may wish to designate a spokesman of the Summit for the purpose of briefing the Press.

It may also be useful to exchange views on the desirability of appointing Spokesmen for the meetings of Senior Officials and Foreign Ministers.

- (iii) *Admission of New Members.*—Gabon, Gambia, Cameroun, Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen and Upper Volta have expressed a keen desire to join the Islamic Conference. Several Heads of State and Government strongly support this desire. Foreign Ministers will be required to decide upon the admission of these States.
- (iv) *Representation of Palestine Liberation Organization.*—Chairman, Palestine Liberation Organization has requested to be represented at the Summit meeting.

Foreign Ministers may, in conformity with past practice, wish to endorse the request.

- (v) *Observers.*—Arab League, Motamar Alam-e-Islam and the Organization for African Unity have approached the Islamic Secretariat for participation in the Summit as observers.

Foreign Ministers may like to reaffirm their past decisions agreeing to the participation of Arab League and Motamar Alam-e-Islam as observers and may wish to take a decision regarding the Organization for African Unity.

- (vi) *Final Act of the Summit.*—While the nature of the document embodying the Summit conclusions will depend on the agenda and the proceedings, Foreign Ministers may wish to exchange views regarding the manner in which the deliberations may be formalized. Practice has varied in the past. Previous meetings have concluded either with joint communiques, declarations or resolutions or a combination thereof.

6. The deliberations during the course of the meetings of the Heads of State and Government will largely ensue from the agenda to be adopted by the Foreign Ministers. The nature of these meetings cannot therefore, be precisely anticipated. However, it is suggested that the following sequence of proceedings for the Opening Session of the Summit may be considered :

- (i) *Convocation of the Conference of Kings, Heads of State and Government (22 February 4.30 p.m.).*—His Majesty King Hassan of Morocco, in his capacity as Chairman of the last Summit held in Rabat, will convene the opening session.

(ii) *Commencement of proceedings with a recitation from the Holy Quran.—*

Qari	will recite
Sura	from the Book

(iii) *Address of Welcome by the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan*(iv) *Election of the President of the Conference of Kings, Heads of State and Government.*—In the past, Foreign Ministers have recommended the Leader of delegation of the host country be elected as President of the Summit.(v) *Address by the President of the Summit*(vi) *General Statements by Leaders of Delegation.*—In view of the short time available for the Summit meetings and keeping in view the number of items on the agenda, Foreign Ministers may wish to decide the number of open sessions required for general debate. In the light of this decision, appropriate changes, if any, will be made in the programme at Annexure I.(vii) *Adjournment.*

WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM THE ARAB OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Guided by the resolution of the First Islamic Summit held in Rabat as well as by the resolutions of the subsequent Conferences of the Foreign Ministers of Islamic countries, the Second Islamic Summit examined the threat posed to world peace by the continued Israeli occupation of Arab territories in violation of the U.N. Charter and the resolutions of the world organization.

Noting with admiration the heroic achievements and sacrifices of the sisterly Arab States which demonstrated their determination and ability to liberate their occupied territories and to secure the restitution of the national rights of the Palestinian people. Welcoming the support received by them in their just and noble struggle from the overwhelming majority of the nations of the world. Recognising that the cessation of hostilities brought about by resolution 338 of the Security Council is not a substitute for a just and lasting settlement in the Middle East in accordance with the principles of the U.N. Charter and the relevant resolutions of the organization ;

Considering it necessary that a peaceful settlement should not in any way compromise the principles of non-acquisition of territory by force, the inviolability of the territorial integrity of states and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to a national destiny in their homeland.

- (1) The Conference *declares* its unreserved support for the right of the sister Arab States to liberate their territories from Israeli occupation by all and any means available to them under the U.N. Charter ;
- (2) *Supports* the efforts of the sisterly Arab States to obtain by peaceful means and negotiations a just and lasting settlement in the area, in accordance with the principles and resolutions of the United Nations ;
- (3) *Calls upon* all States in particular those which are participating in the peace negotiations being conducted in Geneva to ensure that in any settlement envisaged for the situation, strict compliance with the principle of non-acquisition of territory by force, and respect for the national rights of the Palestinian people, is ensured.
- (4) *Insists* that Israel withdraw from all the Arab territories it has occupied since 5 June, 1967.

- (5) *Denounces* Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories in violation of the principles of the U.N. Charter and the resolutions of the United Nations and the illegal measures it has taken to change the demographic and physical aspects of the occupied territories.
 - (6) *Condemns* Israel's violation of human rights in the occupied territories as well as its policy of changing the character of the occupied territories, and considers that such actions constitute an affront to humanity.
-

JERUSALEM**The Second Islamic Summit,**

Reaffirming its commitment to the resolutions of the First Islamic Summit concerning Al Quds, the Holy City of Jerusalem,

Recalling, once again, the deep attachment of the followers of Islam to Jerusalem and the solemn resolve of their Governments to strive for its liberation,

Considering that Israel's continued occupation of Jerusalem, its attempts to annex it, in defiance of the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations and the acts of destruction and profanation of the Holy Places that have occurred under its occupation, have exacerbated tensions in the Middle East and aroused indignation among peoples throughout the world,

Recalling that the U.N. resolutions relating to Jerusalem expressly enunciate the general principle regarding the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by the use of force.

1. *Calls* for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territories occupied since 5 June, 1967, and first of all from Jerusalem and for the restoration of the status it enjoyed prior to Israeli occupation, which was established and sanctified by a history of thirteen hundred years ;

2. *Declares* that the restoration of Jerusalem to the status it enjoyed prior to Israeli occupation is a paramount and unchangeable prerequisite for any peace settlement in the Middle East and that any solution which denies this will be unacceptable to the Islamic countries ;

3. *Condemns* Israel's refusal to comply with the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council calling upon it to rescind all the measures purporting to annex the City to Israel ;

4. *Further declares* that all measures taken by Israel to annex the Holy City are null and void, and condemns the attempt to change the religious and historical character of Jerusalem.

PART TWO

POSITION PAPER

OVERALL SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

For the purposes of this paper, the Middle East is being considered as comprising of the Arab nations from Morocco to the Persian Gulf.

2. The significant historical features of the Arab World are common faith, language and culture, memories of a common glorious past and bitter experience of foreign domination.

3. The strategic importance of the region has in recent decades increased even further due to discovery of vast oil deposits, resulting in an overwhelming dependence of the industrialised countries on the region. As a result of recent events, the Arab States are in a position to play a decisive role in the evolution of world economic relations.

4. The Arab World re-emerged on the world scene in the early part of this century, after losing ground to the Ottoman Turks in the 14th century. It was not until British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1971 that the last vestiges of colonialism were removed. The Arab world now consists of 19 independent States as under :—

Algeria

Bahrain

Egypt

Iraq

Jordan

Kuwait

Lebanon

Libya

Mauritania

Morocco

North Yemen
 Oman
 Qatar
 Saudi Arabia
 South Yemen
 Sudan
 Syria
 Tunisia
 UAE

Out of these, 7 States are among the world's major oil exporters (members of OAPEC) and form a class by themselves due to their affluence. The poorer States are Mauritania, Oman, Sudan and the two Yemens.

5. The shock of the Arab debacle against Israel in 1948 hastened the revolution in the Arab world although the stirrings against Western exploitation, colonialism and the decadent socio-political order had long been building up. Nasser was the torch-bearer of the new era. He epitomized the ideal of Pan-Arabism based on cultural and linguistic nationalism.

The Nasserist ideology is essentially secular in purport although it cannot divorce itself from its Islamic origin which in the first place brought about unity in a large area divided by history, culture and race. Nasser in fact described Egypt as belonging to the three circles *viz.* : nationalism, Arabism and Islam. But in actual practice, he minimised the influence of Islam as a political force among the Arabs.

Nasserism as a force has changed the face of the Arab world. It remains pervasive today, felt by friend and foe. Nasser also split the Arab world into radicals and conservatives, a cleavage which persists. The struggle has been between the republics and the monarchies and, more narrowly, between Nasser (until his death

in 1970) and Faisal. It has been said that they reflected the dual nature of the Arab world—the yearning to be part of the modern world and the traditional origins.

Another important element in the clash was the personal/national ambition to be leader of the Arab world. In his bid for assertion of the Arab identity, Nasser fought vestiges of Western colonialism and exploitation. He reacted to the Western-sponsored Baghdad Pact by embracing the concept of non-alignment. The conservative camp on the other hand identified itself with the West and pan-Islamic forces. Although this division between pro-West and pro-East was tactical in origin, it has had some ideological penetration as well. South Yemen, Iraq and Algeria are well to the left today whereas the monarchies have retained deep distrust of Socialism.

6. An off-shoot of Nasserism has been the Ba'thist ideology believing in Nasserism without Nasser. Its influence has been limited to Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. Under Christian Arab ideologists, Ba'th has adopted a nationalistic racial and secular approach (parallel to Kemalism in Turkey) which is implicitly anti-religious. The division of the Ba'thists in Left and Right wings has added to the complexities of the Arab scene.

7. To complete the picture, note has to be taken of the non-conformist role of the Libyan leader, Col. Gaddafi. He conceives of himself as Nasser's ideological successor but this is not quite true. Gaddafi's Islamic leanings are closer to those of Faisal than to Nasser. However, his republicanism and revolutionary fervour is in the Nasserist tradition and has kept him away from the Saudi ruler. Libyan oil wealth has given a powerful base to Gaddafi but his extreme fervour and impetuosity has detracted from his ability to make the kind of impact he has hoped for and which could have been his.

8. The impetus given to Arab unity by the Nasserist revolution has been manifested by repeated attempts at mergers and unions amongst the Arab States. These have always centred

around Egypt. The United Arab Republic in 1958, joining Syria and Egypt together, was the first in the chain. Unfortunately, all these unions have turned out to be abortive indicating that the yearning for Arab unity has not been able so far to overcome regional and personal loyalties. The latest experiment in the series is the Libya-Tunisia merger signed on 12th January, 1974. The indications are that Tunisia is having second thoughts already. The unlikely combination of Bourguiba and Gaddafi with their different orientations would suggest another failure in the making.

9. Saudi Arabia and Egypt have had stormy periods in their relations. Their clash in the Yemen led to open military involvement. Nasser also tried to contain Saudi influence in the Gulf. The First Arab Summit held in December 1964 sought to narrow down differences in the two warring camps. However, Nasser declared himself "deceived" by the results of the first three Summits and denounced the whole idea in June 1966. He intended to launch an all out war on the Arab "reactionaries". But the trauma of the June 1967 War with Israel effectively check-mated Nasser. It brought home the imperative need of unity in the Arab ranks, and Egypt's inability to go it alone in the confrontation with Israel, without the moral and material support of the conservative group. The Egyptian venture in North Yemen also ended in failure.

10. Nasser's losing image highlighted Faisal's rising stature. This trend has been accelerated since Nasser's death. Sadat in any case lacks the fervour of Nasser's revolutionary ideas and compares poorly with his image. The sharp crystallization of the conservative and radical forces has tended to recede. Egypt has been the recipient of an annual subsidy of £ 50 million from Saudi Arabia since 1967. It has turned to Saudi Arabia for financial support before and after the October 1973 war with Israel. Faisal has led the way in use of the oil weapon against the West. He has adopted a tougher attitude towards Israel and the West than Nasser's heir. There is little doubt that Faisal is today at his peak as the most prestigious Arab leader. He has consolidated

his power steadily, taking care to build a strong home base. He has successfully cultivated all States of the Arabian peninsula except South Yemen. The oil wealth has undoubtedly been his trump card. Put together, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States are fast becoming the wealthiest powers in the world. These ingredients of power were always there, but Faisal has lent steadiness and statesmanship. However, Egypt has some inherent advantages in its bid for leadership of the Arab world. It is the most populous, the most developed and, through its news media, wields the greatest influence in the Arab world.

11. The war of October 1973 has redeemed Arab honour and given them an unprecedented degree of self-confidence. The Arab countries showed remarkable unity during the war. The cease-fire and commencement of peace negotiations have dented this unity but not destroyed it. The two main dissenters *viz.* : Libya and Iraq have remained isolated. The traditionalist group has built up its image through lavish material assistance to the front-line nations and by the use of the oil weapon which has shaken the world. The Arabs have pressurised fencesitters and even pro-Israel nations to abandon their previous posture. The African world has broken off relations with Israel, at least partly because of promise of Arab money.

12. The growing power of the Arab States, particularly the oil-producing ones, has alarmed the U.S., which has held out the threat of military intervention and other coercive measures to ensure oil supplies. The Arab world is very vulnerable to internal and external subversion, particularly the Arabian peninsula is passing through a phase of social and economic upheaval as a result of sudden acquisition of fantastic wealth.

13. There has been a great deal of interest in filling the power vacuum in the Persian Gulf following the departure of the British in 1971. Around 60% of world's known petroleum reserves are estimated to be in this region and the West has become dependent on its supplies. Iran has been most active in assuming the role

of the policeman and protector. Iranian ambitions are encouraged by the Western countries. However, the Arabs mistrust Iran and would not accept Iranian hegemony in the region. The Russians are playing on these fears and have found useful allies in Iraq and South Yemen. So far the Russians have been kept at bay by the conservative regimes in the Arabian peninsula. However, the Arab Summit at Algiers in November 1973 has improved Russian prospects by its call for closer ties with the Socialist bloc in recognition of its favourable attitude during the recent War. It is possible that even Saudi Arabia will establish relations with the Socialist bloc. The net effect would be intensification of Super Power rivalry in the area.

14. The focal point of Arab antagonism has been Israel which is at the same time a relic of the inglorious past of colonial exploitation and a living testimonial of Arab humiliation. Israeli military successes in 1948, 1956 and 1967 encouraged her to adopt an attitude of total defiance and arrogance. Israel had lately made a habit of wanton punitive expeditions on the slightest pretext. Even if the October 1973 War is considered a military stalemate in terms of the actual military situation on the ground, one can understand why it looks like a military victory to the Arabs who had known nothing but humiliation in previous fighting with Israel. The boost to the Arab morale has been obvious. On the other hand, it appears that Israel has perhaps a better sense of realities now. Under prodding from the Americans, Israel has made some gestures of accommodation. The Disengagement Agreement signed between Israel and Egypt on 18th January 1974 has been described by President Sadaat as a "turning point" in the history of the Middle East. It certainly seems to be a set-back to the Israeli hawks' forward policy. The Geneva Conference represents the best chance the Middle East has known for a negotiated peace settlement. The direct involvement of the two Super Powers has greatly strengthened the Conference's prospects. Also, as a result of the greatly improved Arab performance in the last War, the two sides are acting as equals which augurs well for the terms and durability of whatever Agreement emerges out of Geneva.

15. The Geneva Conference faces a formidable task. The two most complex issues are the restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people and the status of Jerusalem. The first-mentioned involves the dispute between P.L.O. and Jordan as to who represents the Palestinian people. Jordan demands the return of the *status quo* existing before the June 1967 War when she had sovereignty over the West Bank of the Jordan River including over East Jerusalem. Jordan regards the Palestinian people living in this territory as its own citizens. Even Jordan proper has a substantial element of Palestinians. The official stand of Jordan is that after Israeli withdrawal, the Palestinians should exercise their right of self-determination through a plebiscite to decide whether they wish to remain an integral part of Jordan or to set up their own State. Until such a plebiscite is held no one, neither Jordan nor the PLO can claim to be the sole representative of the Palestinian people. On the other hand, P.L.O. denounces Jordan's *locus standi* in the matter pointing out that Jordan had occupied this portion of Palestine in 1948. P.L.O.'s hand has been greatly strengthened by its recognition as the sole representative of the Palestinian people by the 6th Arab Summit held at Algiers in November 1973. It seems only a matter of time before a Palestine Government-in-exile is set up. This will probably be recognized by all Arab States except Jordan. However, Jordan is banking on Israel's refusal to have any dealings with P.L.O. or a Palestinian Government-in-exile. However, sometimes ago, Jordan had hinted that a solution to the impasse could be the formation of a mixed Arab delegation at the Geneva Conference consisting of both PLO and Jordanians. There has been a further softening of this stand. Jordan now concedes that it is not the only representative of the Palestinians and that PLO can participate in the Geneva Peace Conference as a voice of other Palestinian interests.

16. Even the question of Israeli withdrawals from occupied Arab territories presents many imponderables. It is unlikely that Israel will be able to obtain the kind of a territorial settlement, it had envisaged in the years following the 1967 War. It may be more 'reasonable' in its demands. The Arabs also may eventually

agree to minor modifications. However, Israeli withdrawal from strategic points such as Sharm-El-Sheikh and the Golan Heights will be difficult to bring about and if forthcoming, might entail Egyptian and Syrian concessions such as recognition of Israel, internationalization of East Jerusalem and a compromise on the Palestinian issue. As for withdrawal from the West Bank, Israel can be expected to delay this and play on the inter-Arab differences as to who would acquire control of the West Bank after Israeli withdrawal.

17. The future status of Jerusalem is the second most complex issue before the Geneva Conference. The Israelis have been most adamant on retaining the whole of Jerusalem. Jordan insists on the restoration of the *status quo* ante 1967 War. P.L.O. demands restoration to the Palestinians. The majority of Islamic nations would be satisfied with Israeli withdrawal from East Jerusalem and restoration of its Islamic character. However, the Sudan has joined Ethiopia in a demarche with the Pope to make Jerusalem an open city to the three religions. The Vatican has been of the view that Jerusalem should be under international control. Israel will never agree to such a status at least in so far as that part of the city which was seized by Israel in 1948. It would require all the pressure the US can bring to bear on it to make Israel withdraw from the old city of Jerusalem which it seized in the 1967 war from Jordan.

POSITION PAPER

WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM ARAB TERRITORIES

I. INTRODUCTION

The territorial dimension of the Middle East dispute came to the forefront after the June, 1967 War. Although, in 1949, Israel had extended the areas under its control beyond the lines indicated in the U.N. Partition Plan, the conflict by and large remained whether Israel had a right to exist as a State and about the future of the Palestinian refugees. Also, in 1948 Jordan had occupied the West Bank and East Jerusalem and Egypt had taken control of the Gaza Strip. They, therefore, could not press the point of Israeli encroachment too far. Again in 1956, Israeli occupation of Sinai was short; it was compelled to withdraw because of the joint opposition of the Super Powers.

II. THE 6-DAY WAR

2. In 1967, on the other hand, Israel's pre-emptive attack, at least against Egypt and Syria if not Jordan, had the tacit approval of the United States. It is likely that initially Israel's objectives were limited to obtaining control over certain strategic points and destroying the Arab military potential. In the war, Israel was able to occupy the whole of Egyptian Sinai, the West Bank of Jordan including East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the Syrian Golan Heights. The extent of its success may have even surprised Israel. From the sequence of events following the conflict it would appear that the Israel's intention to retain some of the territories it occupied was progressively reinforced as the extent of its victory dawned on its military and political leadership. The fact that while the territory under its control grew three-fold while its borders with neighbouring States decreased in length, was no doubt an important factor in making the retention of the occupied territories an attractive proposition for Israel.

III. CEASE-FIRE WITHOUT WITHDRAWAL

3. The Security Council's consideration of the war reflected the power alignments in the Middle East. United States support for Israel was able to prevent the adoption of a resolution which would have called for a cease-fire and for withdrawal of forces to their own territories. Resolution 233 (1967) of 6 June called for an immediate cease-fire; Resolution 234 (1967) of 7 June, called for a cease-fire and discontinuance of all military activities; Resolution 235 (1967) of 9 June demanded immediate cessation of hostilities and requested the Secretary-General to make immediate contacts with the Governments of Israel and Syria to arrange compliance with its Resolutions, and Resolution 336 (1967) of 11 June condemned all cease-fire violations, affirmed the previous Resolutions and called for full cooperation with the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation (UNTSO).

4. A USSR draft resolution which called for a cease-fire and total withdrawals failed to obtain the required majority on 13 June. Next day the United States presented another Resolution which merely called for the continued implementation of the cease-fire "as a first urgent step towards the establishment of a stable peace in the Middle East."

5. These differences in the approach of the United States and Israel on the one hand and that of the Soviet Union and the Arab States on the other were underlined once again during the 5th Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly. Five draft Resolutions were submitted in the Assembly which contained the spectrum of views ranging between the Soviet and American positions and none of these Resolutions received the required two third majority.

6. The Middle East question was again discussed at the 22nd Session of the General Assembly but was also inconclusive.

IV. RESOLUTION 242 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

7. On 7 November 1967, the United States submitted a proposal to the Security Council that a Special Representative of the Secretary-General be appointed to bring about a political settlement. The Resolution contained principles including "withdrawal from occupied territories", end of belligerency, recognition of existence and sovereignty of all States in the area and their right to "secure and recognised boundaries."

8. This resolution reflected the 5 principles of peace enunciated by President Johnson earlier, which emphasised the right of all States in the area to "national life", political independence and territorial integrity; called for recognised boundaries and other arrangements that would give each security and made it clear that "the parties to the conflict must be parties to the peace" *i.e.* the necessity of direct negotiations. The U.S. proposal was rejected by Egypt and the Soviet Union. On the same day, an Indian sponsored proposal was tabled. It referred to the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force, the right of all States in the area to live in peace and complete security and called for termination of the state of belligerency. The Indian proposal also requested the Secretary-General to despatch a Special Representative to the area to achieve the purpose of the Resolution. Even this weak draft was unacceptable to the United States.

9. Two weeks later, a compromise was put forward by the United Kingdom and adopted by the Council. This Resolution, No. 242 (1967) of 22 November in its preamble emphasized "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war". In its operative part it affirmed 3 principles for "a just and lasting peace": Israeli withdrawal "from territories occupied in the recent conflict"; and the termination of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries.

10. The future of the Palestinian people was, significantly, relegated to secondary importance. The Resolution merely affirmed "the necessity" of "achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem", which was equated with freedom of navigation and creation of demilitarised zones.

11. Thus, in exchange for territorial withdrawals the Arabs States were required to recognise the right of Israel to exist "within secure and recognised boundaries." Of more immediate importance, was the fact that the *action* requested by resolution 242 (in operative paras 3 and 4) was limited to requesting the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative to "establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned" to promote a "peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles" of the Resolution.

12. Resolution 242 was accepted by Egypt and Jordan but not by Syria. Later, Israel also communicated its acceptance of the resolution but accompanied this with its own interpretation of its provisions.

V. THE DIFFERENCES IN THE INTERPRETATION OF RESOLUTION 242

13. The aspect which made resolution 242 acceptable to all sides—its ambiguity—was also its greatest drawback. Even as the Council adopted the resolution, these differences come to the fore. For example, the representative of India speaking on behalf of Mali and Nigeria, said that the resolution committed the Council to the application of the principle of total withdrawal of Israel forces from all the territories occupied by Israel as a result of the June conflict. That being so, Israel could not use the word "secure and recognized boundaries" to retain any occupied territory. The representative of Israel on the other hand stated that movement from the cease-fire lines could be envisaged only in the framework of a just and lasting peace. The "central affirmation" of the resolution was the need for such a peace based on secure and recognized boundaries.

14. These differences were further emphasized in the efforts the Secretary-General's Special Representative made to secure a peaceful settlement. On 23rd November, 1967, the Secretary-General invited Mr. Gunnar Jarring, Sweden's Ambassador to Moscow, to accept designation as his Special Representative. When Mr. Jarring met the parties in December, 1967 he found the Israeli Government of the firm view that the Middle East question could be resolved only through direct negotiations culminating in a peace treaty and that there could be no question of the withdrawal of its forces prior to such a settlement. Israel regarded resolution 242 as a "framework for agreement". It could not be fulfilled without a direct exchange of views and proposals leading to bilateral contractual agreements. Egypt and Jordan, for their part, insisted that there could be no discussion between the parties until Israeli forces had been withdrawn to the positions they occupied prior to June 5, 1967.

15. On the provision concerning withdrawals, there was a significant divergence between Egypt and Jordan on the one hand and Israel on the other. The former basing themselves on the affirmation of the principle of non-acquisition of territory in resolution 242, interpreted the phrase, withdrawal "from territories occupied in the recent conflict" as meaning withdrawal from *all* the occupied territories. Israel referred to the fact that the English text of resolution 242 did not speak of withdrawals from *the* territories but referred to territories without the article. The extent of territory it was required to withdraw from, was, it said, dependent on the agreement reached between the parties on "secure and recognized boundaries."

VI. THE SEARCH FOR A SETTLEMENT

1. *The Jarring Mission*

16. Ambassador Jarring tried repeatedly to bridge the gap between these differences. After his initial contacts in December, 1967, he sought to obtain assurances from the parties that they would implement resolution 242, hoping that this could provide the

basis for discussion. The replies merely amplified the differing views of the resolution. In March, 1968 he presented a draft letter from himself to the Secretary-General which referred to the idea of the parties meeting under his auspices. Israel eventually accepted this, but Egypt and Jordan pressed for a more precise declaration by Israel of its willingness to implement the resolution. Inconclusive talks were held by Mr. Jarring with the parties in May-June and August-September, 1968. Their positions were set out in writing which made clear the essential differences between them.

17. The Special Representative made two further visits to the Middle East in December, 1968 and March-April, 1969 when he submitted a series of questions to the parties. Their detailed replies were generally a repetition of the attitudes and showed the serious divergencies as regards the interpretation of the resolution and the procedure for putting it into effect.

2. Four Power Talks

18. The Four Power discussions in New York came about as a result of a Soviet initiative in January, 1969, when it circulated a "Peace Memorandum" to the U.S., France and U.K. This put forth the idea of stage by stage implementation of resolution 242. The Four Power Talks began in early April, 1969. The United States put forward a "package deal" on the Middle East in a 13-point proposal. This would have the parties accept Resolution 242 and agree to implement all its provisions "in good faith". It also provided that agreement must be reached on all provisions of the settlement before implementation of a final accord began. The final accord would include an agreement on the location of secure and recognised boundaries and that all areas vacated by Israel will be de-militarized.

19. This was rejected by Egypt as representing the Israeli point of view. The Soviet Union submitted a counter proposal which also embodied a "package" rather than the previous time-table approach of the original paper. The United States initially welcomed the Soviet counter proposal but later indicated objections to

the insistence on return to pre-June, 1967 lines, absence of an express agreement to recognise Israel etc. In May 1969, a 6-point agreement on general principles emerged which besides reiterating those contained in the Security Council resolution, stated that the resolution constitutes a "package" to be implemented after agreement is reached in regard to each of its components.

20. This was a further weakening of the Egyptian and Jordanian position. The four power meetings continued at various intervals; but could not make any further progress, primarily because of the differences on the provision concerning withdrawals.

3. *U.S. Cease-fire Proposals and revival of the Jarring Mission*

21. Towards the end of 1969, renewed clashes broke out on the Suez and Jordanian fronts and continued with varying severity through the first half of next year. In June, 1970, the U.S. proposed to the Governments of Israel, Jordan and the UAR that they should advise Ambassador Jarring of their willingness to carry out resolution 242 and designate representatives to hold discussions under his auspices, whose purpose would be the establishment of a just and lasting peace between them. In order to facilitate agreement, the parties should strictly observe from 1st October, 1970, the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council. This was accepted by the parties and led to the renewal of the Jarring Mission.

22. The General Assembly, which considered the Middle East situation in the autumn of 1970 for the first time since 1967, also endorsed the continuance of the cease-fire and the Jarring Mission in resolution 2628 (XXV).

23. Ambassador Jarring resumed his discussions with the parties at headquarters on 5th January, 1971. Israel presented a paper to Ambassador Jarring which demanded commitments from the other side to enter into peace agreements with it and give the undertakings referred to in para 1 (ii) of resolution 242. Egypt and Jordan continued to regard the resolution as containing provisions to be implemented by the parties and expressed readiness to carry out their obligations under the resolution in full, provided that Israel did likewise.

24. Thereupon, Ambassador Jarring sought to obtain parallel and simultaneous commitments from both sides : from Israel a commitment to withdraw its forces from occupied Egyptian territories to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine ; and from Egypt to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make explicit thereunder to Israel on a reciprocal basis, various undertakings and acknowledgements arising directly or indirectly from para 1 (ii) of resolution 242.

25. The UAR replied on 15th February, 1971, saying that she would accept the specific commitments requested of her, if Israel would likewise give commitments covering its own obligations under resolution 242, including commitments for the withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza strip and for the achievement of a just settlement of the refugee problem in accordance with UN resolutions.

26. In its reply, Israel reiterated that it was prepared for meaningful negotiations on all subjects relevant to a peace agreement between the two countries. However, on the crucial question of withdrawals Israel said it would give an undertaking concerning withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from "the Israel-UAR cease-fire line" to the secure recognised and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement. "Israel would not withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967 line".

27. On 7th March, 1971 Egypt declared that it no longer considered itself committed to the cease-fire. However, this did not mean that political action would cease. Subsequently the talks under Ambassador Jarring's auspices lapsed. Although he held consultations in New York and elsewhere, Ambassador Jarring found himself faced with the same deadlock and little possibility of actively pursuing his mission.

4. *The Rogers Plan*

28. In May, 1971, the U.S. Secretary of State suggested that since the prospects for reaching a final settlement were not bright

it was best to start with an interim settlement between Egypt and Israel. He proposed a plan which included Israeli withdrawal from the East Bank and the Sinai in stages, creation of demilitarised zones, stationing of international forces in the evacuated zones and reopening of the Suez Canal. Mr. Rogers visited Cairo and Tel Aviv to discuss these proposals which were, however, made only informally to the parties.

29. Egypt's view was that in the first place, Israel must give a positive and affirmative answer to Mr. Jarring's query about evacuating the occupied Arab territories. Withdrawal would take place in two phases, to begin with to a line stretching from El-Arish to Ras El Mohamed, and within a specified period to the international boundaries. The U.N. would supervise the withdrawal and establishment of demilitarised zones and so on.

30. Israel's view was quite different. Its forces would withdraw to a line to be determined by Israeli GHQ and the Bar Lev Line would continue to be maintained by Israeli personnel in civilian clothes. The precise distance of the pull back would depend on the length of the cease-fire period accepted by Egypt. Israel would accept Egyptian civilians across the Canal but no military personnel. Israel demanded clear commitment that it would be allowed to use the Canal regardless of a final settlement. As for a link of these arrangements with a final settlement, all Israel was prepared to say was that the new cease-fire line was not the final line to be defined in the settlement.

31. Thereafter, the Rogers' initiative petered out.

5. *The OAU Mission of Inquiry*

32. In response to a decision of the Organization of African Unity, the Heads of State of Cameroun, Zaire, Nigeria and Senegal visited Israel and Egypt twice in November 1971. The mission noted certain "positive elements" in the replies it had received from the two Governments. Both parties had renewed their acceptance of resolution 242, and were ready to resume indirect negotiations under auspices of Ambassador Jarring. The mission

concluded that negotiations could be renewed if the practical application of the concept of "secure and recognised boundaries" did not oblige Egypt to alienate part of its national territory and that it was necessary to obtain Israel's agreement to the putting into effect of arrangements offering sufficient guarantees to ensure its security without territorial annexation.

6. *Resumption of the Jarring Mission and General Assembly consideration.*

33. On 13 December, 1971, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2799 (XXVI) which, apart from reiterating the principles of Security Council resolution 242, requested the Secretary-General to reactivate the mission of his Special Representative. It also called upon Israel to respond favourably to the Jarring's peace initiative, and for the parties to cooperate with him to work out practical measures for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area.

34. In response to Jarring's efforts to resume his mission, Egypt took the view that he should ask Israel for a commitment to withdraw from Egyptian territories before it could take part in discussions with Israeli authorities. Israel made it clear that it was not prepared to give this or any other form of commitment on the question of withdrawal of forces. Despite this deadlock, Ambassador Jarring suggested that the parties should exchange through him clarifications of their positions on the various subjects dealt with in resolution 242, with a view to formulating provisions for inclusion in a peace treaty. The Egyptians agreed to participate in the process of clarification. Israel first demanded an assurance that Jarring was guided solely by resolution 242 and not the Assembly's resolution 2799 (XXVI). This was given, but it was not possible to proceed further. The position with regard to Jordan was similar.

35. At its 27th Session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2949 (XXVII) which deplored Israel's non-compliance with resolution 2799 (XXVI) and reiterated the principles for a settlement contained in resolution 242, emphasising in particular that

the acquisition of territories by force is inadmissible. The resolution also invited Israel to declare publicly its adherence to this principle and to declare that the changes it had carried out in the occupied Arab territories, in contravention of the Geneva Convention of 1949 were null and void, and called upon Israel to rescind forthwith all such measures and to desist from all policies and practices affecting the physical character of the occupied Arab territories. It called upon all states not to recognise such changes and measures carried out by Israel in the occupied Arab territories and invited them to avoid actions, including actions in the field of aid, that could constitute recognition of that occupation.

VI. ISRAEL'S TERRITORIAL DEMANDS

36. As noted above, in its official pronouncements, Israel has been most reluctant to state categorically how much territory it desires to retain. Of course, the Old City of Jerusalem has been officially annexed into Israel, but its firm intentions regarding the other parts of the Arab territories have not been communicated. An insight into Israel's territorial ambitions are provided by two plans, the first put forward by Defence Minister Moshe Dayan and the other by Deputy Premier Yigal Allon.

37. The Dayan plan envisaged retention of the major part of the occupied territories and was based on the premise of Israel's overwhelming military superiority and an "arrangement" with the population of these areas. This 'plan' was never formally presented.

38. The Allon Plan is said to have been formulated soon after the 1967 war. The Plan envisaged the annexation of East Jerusalem and Control of the Golan Heights. Furthermore, a security belt 10 to 15 miles wide would be established overlooking the Jordan River. New Israeli towns would be set up overlooking the Arab population centres of Jericho and Hebron. The populous areas of the West Bank, behind the security belt, would be returned to Jordan in exchange for the Gaza Strip whose refugees it would be asked to accommodate. A small corridor would link the West

Bank with the East Bank of the Jordanian State (*see* MAP I). The Sinai would be demilitarised on the Egyptian side and would be guarded at the southern tip by a new Israeli fishing and resort town to be built at Sharm El Sheikh. The Israeli withdrawal would be to a new north-south border running from Sharm El Sheikh north to El-Arish. The Sinai's most fertile triangle would be taken over and guarded by fortified settlements to be built there (*see* MAP II).

39. From all accounts, it would appear that this Plan was at least partially if not wholly accepted by the Israeli Cabinet. Israeli "Kiobutzim" have been established on the Jordan River, the Golan Heights and Sharm-El-Sheikh. Yet, the decisions about these settlements were taken in the aftermath of the 1967 war when Israel was confident of its military superiority.

VII. THE 1973 WAR AND THE CHANGED REALITIES

40. The diplomatic efforts to reach a settlement in the Middle East have naturally reflected the hitherto weak bargaining position of the Arab countries. As noted above, Egypt and Jordan were not able to secure the restoration of their occupied territories even in exchange for an express recognition of Israel's existence. Israel has tried to obtain both such recognition and also such territory as it deems would provide it secure frontiers.

41. Israel's ability to ignore the overwhelming view of the international community has been possible primarily because of the support it has obtained so far from the United States. It is known that the U.S. does not approve of more than minor rectifications to the pre-1967 borders. But, until the 1973 war, because of the domestic Jewish lobby, it was prevented from exercising any pressure on Israel to accept what must have been the State Department's objective assessment of political necessity. Moreover, there was no external compulsion upon the U.S. to exercise such pressure.

42. The other Power with any significant leverage, the Soviet Union, pursued a policy of cautious support to its Arab allies, in particular Egypt, with which it had signed a Treaty of 'Peace

and Friendship'. The USSR was prepared to give diplomatic backing to the Arabs. It supplied them military hardware as well. Yet it continuously cautioned them against a resumption of hostilities. In part, this attitude may have been based on a pessimistic assessment of the Arab military capabilities. Largely, it was influenced by its desire to avoid a confrontation with the U.S. in the Middle East, at a time when its preoccupation was with its eastern frontiers with China.

43. An understanding of these limitations in Soviet support naturally engendered Arab misgivings, especially after the Moscow and Washington Summit meetings between Brezhnev and Nixon to promote the era of Super-Power *detente*. The pre-occupation of the Super Powers with their own affairs must also have strengthened the conviction of those in the Arab world who held that Arab territories could be regained only by a resort to force.

44. It would be simple to believe that the Arab States would have embarked on the October war without the knowledge of the Soviet Union. However, in retrospect one can appreciate the elaborate attempts that were made to convince the Soviets, and the rest of the world, that the Arabs had no choice but to go to war. The convening of the Security Council Session in June, 1973, just before the Brezhnev visit to Washington, was a part of the strategy. Two other factors must have been important in convincing the Soviets that the risk was worthwhile : first, the limited Arab objectives in the war *i.e.* to revive concern for a solution and second, the increasing unity and strength demonstrated by them *inter alia* because of King Faisal's agreement to back the Egyptian-Syrian strategy to the hilt.

45. This strategy, it is believed, was coordinated at the Algiers Non-Aligned Summit in August last. The military objectives were to regain control over the East Bank of the Suez and the Golan Heights and thence to negotiate a peace from a more advantageous position, suitably assisted by the economic and psychological edge of the oil weapon.

46. The Arabs were not entirely successful in gaining these military objectives for, despite their brilliant crossing of the Canal, the Egyptians were unable to resist the Israeli counter-thrust against the West Bank. Moreover, the Syrians, though they fought well, lost some more territory to the Israelis. But the Arabs registered some significant gains nevertheless. They demonstrated a surprising capacity to fight a war with the most sophisticated weapons; they showed a refreshing unity during the war, and they followed this up with a coordinated policy in oil cutbacks and embargoes to persuade the industrialised countries to adopt a more 'even-handed' approach to the Middle East dispute. Over and above all this, the war revived the self-confidence of the Arabs and "shattered the myth of Israeli invincibility". All the power calculations have thus had to be revised.

47. The effort that was required to resupply Israel, and the odium it produced among its friends and foes alike, was cause for consternation in the United States. It must have drawn at least three conclusions from the war : first, Israel cannot maintain its military superiority over its neighbours without continued American assistance; second, this assistance, while Israel continues to occupy Arab lands and the fate of the Palestinians remains undecided, would put it at odds with an increasingly powerful and determined cartel of Arab oil producing countries, and finally, the perpetuation of the present situation could ignite another conflict in which the possibility of a Super-Power confrontation could not be ruled out.

48. The renewed U.S. interest in a peace settlement is an acknowledgement of these realities, and its haste to produce an agreement is no doubt dictated by a desire to secure for Israel the best terms possible while it is still in a relatively dominant position. The Arabs, of course, suspect that the U.S. may be playing an elaborate game designed to divide them in their political strategy, including the use of the oil weapon. This may be a reasonable supposition.

49. The Soviet motives and strategy in the Middle East are somewhat more complex. It will support the objectives of the Arabs to the extent that these contribute to enhancing Soviet influence in the area. However, the Soviet Union does not endorse the extreme Arab aim of liquidating Israel as is apparent from its pressure on the PLO to agree to a separate Palestinian State on the West Bank. In fact, there are some who believe that the Soviet Union would not even wish to see the Arabs in a dominant military position in the Middle East. This is for two good reasons. First, any confrontation in the area contains an inherent possibility of a direct confrontation with the United States; secondly, without an Israeli irritant in the Middle East the Arabs would have little need of the Soviet Union. For the moment, however, Soviet influence is on the ascendant. The Arab Summit in Algiers has recommended that Arab ties with the Socialist bloc should be further strengthened.

VIII. RESOLUTION 338 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

50. The cease-fire resolution adopted by the Security Council was the outcome of an agreement between the two Super-Powers. No doubt, each would have wished its allies to obtain a greater edge in the conflict. The Americans were more anxious for a cease-fire at the initial stages of the war when the Arabs seemed to have the upper hand. Their reverses of the next week galvanized the Soviet Union to play an active part with the Americans in securing agreement for an initially acceptable cease-fire resolution.

51. Resolution 338 of the Security Council reflects the uncertain military position on 21-22 October. Besides calling for a cease-fire, the resolution attempts to meet the conflicting views of both sides on the substance of and procedure for reaching a peace settlement. Thus in one paragraph, resolution 338 calls upon the parties to start implementation of resolution 242 in all its parts, immediately after the cease-fire. This accommodates the Egyptian view of resolution 242 as constituting a *plan* for a peace settlement to be implemented by the parties. However, in the next paragraph, the resolution decides that immediate negotiations start between

the parties, under appropriate auspices, aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. This was essentially an acceptance of the Israeli insistence on direct negotiations within the framework of resolution 242. It can be argued that by accepting negotiations before an Israeli commitment to withdraw, Egypt has resiled from its previous position. On the other hand, the Egyptians point out that the Israelis, by agreeing to implement resolution 242, have given an implicit commitment to withdraw, thus removing the Egyptian objection to direct negotiations. Resolution 338 of the Security Council does lend itself to such divergent interpretations, but so far this has not posed a problem in the process of negotiations.

52. The immediate problem faced after the adoption of the resolution was the Israeli violation of the cease-fire, almost as soon as it came into effect, to improve its strategic position. This and further violations by both sides resulted in the adoption of Security Council Resolution 239 and 340, which confirmed the call for a cease-fire, called upon the parties to return to the positions of 22 October, and established the 7000-man United Nations Emergency Force to supervise the truce.

53. Despite the difficulties in maintaining the cease-fire the United States and the Soviet Union lost no time in initiating the preparations for the negotiations referred to in resolution 338. In response to assurances from these Powers, Egypt and Jordan agreed to participate in the Geneva Peace Talks subject to certain conditions.

IX. THE ARAB STRATEGY AFTER THE WAR

54. The Arab political strategy was spelt out at the recent Arab Summit in Algiers and indicates that the Arabs wish to pursue two simultaneous objectives: one, the evacuation of occupied territories and second, restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Withdrawals, the Summit insisted, should be from all territories, but it is believed that in a secret

understanding of the Big Four ; Sadaat, Asad, Faisal and Boume-dienne, it was agreed that while the pre-1967 status of Jerusalem was not negotiable there was room for minor adjustments on some other sectors. It is also notable that by the restoration of Palestinian rights the Arab States, apart from Libya, no longer envisage the destruction of Israel or the absorption of the Jewish population into a Palestinian State. They would, for the meantime at least, settle for the creation of a separate Palestinian State on the West Bank. The Arab Summit endorsed the participation of the front-line States in the Geneva Talks within the framework of these objectives.

55. There are, nevertheless, differences in the degree of priority attached by the various Arab States to the issues of withdrawals and Palestinian rights. While countries such as Algeria place primary emphasis on the Palestinian problem, Egypt's immediate priority is to secure Israeli withdrawal from its territories, Syria would appear to fall between the Algerian and Egyptian position. Jordan, for one, finds itself isolated on its insistence that the West Bank be returned to it and not to the Palestinians, at least until a plebiscite is held after Israeli withdrawal.

X. DISENGAGEMENT ON THE SUEZ

56. The Egyptian preoccupation with the evacuation of its territories was apparent in its insistence to Dr. Kissinger that the first item of priority in the overall settlement was disengagement of troops. After protracted and complex negotiations, an agreement was reached for a disengagement of forces on the Suez front and the withdrawal of Israeli troops to the disengagement lines to be completed in 40 days. The disengagement agreement includes the following principles :—

- (a) Egyptian forces will be deployed on the East side of the Canal, West of the Sinai Mountains and the Israeli forces further East along these Mountains ;
- (b) the area between the forces will be demilitarised ;

- (c) The Egyptian forces east of the Canal and the Israeli forces upto a specified depth will be limited in armaments ;
- (d) The disengagement would be completed not later than 40—60 days after it begins ;
- (e) This agreement is not a final peace agreement but “ a first step towards a final, just and durable peace, according to the provisions of the Security Council resolution 338 and within the framework of the Geneva Conference ”.

57. According to our Ambassador in Cairo, Egypt and Israel also signed a document containing Secret clauses designed to disguise the nature and extent of the concessions made by each side and to ensure linkage between disengagement and further progress towards an overall settlement.

58. The agreement appears to have created a rift in the Arab ranks. The Algerian reaction has stressed its negative aspects, and President Sadaat has found it necessary to assure his Arab allies that Egypt is still committed to the overall Arab objectives and that the agreement does not reflect a decision to ‘ go it alone ’. Nonetheless the other Arab States do not seem to agree that this agreement is a ‘ turning point in the history ’ of the Middle East and have resisted the Egyptian suggestion that the oil embargo be lifted as a gesture to the U.S.

XI. THE POSSIBLE TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS IN A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT

59. In the present context, the kind of territorial acquisition which the Dayan and Allon Plans had hoped for seem to be out of the question. If the pressure on the U.S. is maintained through a coordinated Arab oil and economic strategy, as it has so far, it is possible that Israel may have to settle for minor modifications to the 1967 lines. This, as stated above, may be acceptable to the Arabs.

(i) *The Sinai front*

60. The disengagement agreement raises the question whether the new lines may not become frozen in case an overall settlement is unattainable. This is a definite possibility and the reason why Egypt still requires the backing of the Arab (and other) countries to assure total withdrawals. The shape of the final lines can only be conjectured. In November, the Christian Science Monitor published a map (MAP III) which showed 3 possible lines where the new Egyptian-Israeli borders may be drawn. Option 1 is out, since Israeli forces are already to withdraw behind these positions, under the disengagement agreement. Option 2 is unlikely to be acceptable to the Egyptians. The negotiations may, therefore, centre around option 3, specifically over the control of Sharm El Shaikh. It is possible that for a limited period the Egyptians may agree to demilitarisation of this strategic point. Also, a relatively large demilitarised zone running along the entire north-south line between Egypt and Israel in the Sinai is a definite possibility.

(ii) *The Golan Front*

61. Israel would be loath to give up control of this strategic territory. However, in exchange for a *de facto* or *de jure* Syrian recognition of its existence, it may agree to a partial withdrawal and demilitarisation of the rest of the Golan Heights. The Syrians will insist on total Israeli withdrawal, but may agree to demilitarisation of the Golan Heights provided Syrian sovereignty over the area is maintained and the civilians displaced since 1967 are allowed to return.

(iii) *The Jordanian Front*

62. A settlement on the West Bank may be the most problematic. While the dispute continues between Jordan and the other Arabs, as to who would gain possession of the West Bank after Israeli withdrawal, Israel would not be under any direct pressure to vacate the territory. If at all it is obliged to withdraw, Israel would rather have King Hussein than Yasser Arafat for a neighbour. Israel feels that King Hussein may be agreeable to allowing rectifications in the

pre-1967 borders, whereas Yasser Arafat is, they consider, committed to bring about Israel's destruction. Jordan may also be amenable to the Israeli view that the West Bank be demilitarised, although it would not go so far as to accept an Israeli "security belt" along the banks of the Jordan River. Nor is Jordan averse to allowing the Israelis to delay evacuation from the West Bank if it is to pass into Palestinian hands. The kind of territorial settlement that will emerge in the West Bank is, therefore, dependent on the nature of the political agreement reached between Jordan and the Palestinians.

XII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PAKISTAN'S POLICY AT THE SECOND ISLAMIC SUMMIT

63. The shape of a final territorial settlement in the Middle East is, of course, not of direct political concern to Pakistan. Pakistan has based its stand on this question on the principle of non-acquisition of territory by the use of force. Respect for this principle is of special importance to Pakistan in the context of its relations with its own neighbours. The Pakistan delegation should strongly reiterate this principle and call for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the territories it has occupied since 5 June, 1967.

64. Nevertheless, we will not be able to completely pass over the differences within the Arab States and between them and the other Islamic countries. As noted above, there are differences, primarily between Egypt and the others, on the priority to be accorded to Israeli withdrawals in relation to the issue of Palestinian rights, and between Jordan and the rest about the future of the West Bank. Col. Qaddifi's presence at the Islamic Summit will accentuate these differences even further. Moreover, the extreme Arab positions will contrast with those of some of the non-Arab countries, such as Turkey and Iran, which are not resolute on the demand for total Israeli withdrawal.

65. It is recommended that Pakistan should attempt to adhere to the mainstream of Arab opinion. We should not lean too much towards any one viewpoint on issues such as the disengagement

agreement, the prospects of the Geneva talks, the idea of a separate Palestinian State etc. However, we should be consistent in upholding basic principles, particularly the one concerning non-acquisition of territory by the use of force.

66. It is recommended that, to begin with, Pakistan should refrain from any direct or detailed reference to the issues on which differences exist. We may allow the parties directly concerned to voice these differences and to state their respective positions. We could then attempt to promote a conciliation of these differences, so that an agreed statement could be endorsed in the Lahore Declaration on Israeli withdrawals from Arab territories.

POSITION PAPER

THE PALESTINE PROBLEM

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The impulse behind Jewish nationalism taking shape as Zionism was the desire for security on the part of the persecuted Jews of East Europe where they formed an alien element, different from the people around them, and abler in commerce and organization.

2. Theodor Herzl an Austrian Jewish journalist founded the Zionist organization in 1897 to strive for nation-hood for the Jews. Herzl's idea was to purchase Palestine outright from the Turks. However, Sultan Hamid spurned the proposal. The British Government offered the Zionist Congress territory in present day Uganda for Zionist colonisation. This was acceptable to Herzl but was denounced by Weizmann and after the death of Herzl the offer was declined.

3. The Jews continued to pester the British Government for acquisition of Palestine. The Balfour Declaration set the seal on Weizmann's efforts and gave the backing of a great power to Jewish emigration into Palestine. The infamous declaration of November, 1917 reads as follows :—

“ THE BALFOUR DECLARATION

*Foreign Office,
November 2nd, 1917.*

DEAR LORD ROTHSCHILD,

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet :—

“ His Majesty's government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object,

it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

Yours sincerely,
AUTHUR JAMES BALFOUR."

3. Giving this undertaking to the Zionists was opportunism pure and simple. Some propagandist appeal to world Jewry was badly needed to disrupt Jewish support of the Central Powers and to win over American opinion particularly in financial circles to aid Britain.

5. Subsequent to the war, the Council of the League of Nations conferred upon the British Government the Mandate for Palestine, which came into force in 1923. The Balfour Declaration was incorporated in the treaty of peace with Turkey, and also in the Mandate for Palestine. In this context, Articles 2 and 6 of the Mandate are significant which were as follows :

"Article 2. The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion."

"Article 6. The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes."

6. Zionist strategy was to bring into Palestine so many Jews from Russia and Eastern Europe that they would become the majority and that this should happen at such speed that the Arabs would not have time to build up an effective opposition. Nevertheless this policy speedily aroused Arab hostility as the number of immigrants increased.

7. In 1936, grave political disturbances broke out in Palestine, as a result of the tension caused by the increasing immigration of Jews into that country. The six months Arab Strike which resulted in extensive loss of life and property led to the appointment of a Royal Commission in August, 1936 under the Chairmanship of Lord Peel, to investigate the causes and to make recommendations. In the Commission's report partition of the country was advocated. However this was opposed in the British parliament and by the Arab leadership in Palestine. The Zionists were not enthusiastic either.

8. This was followed by a Round Table Conference of Jews and Arabs in White Hall in February, 1939, but since no agreement could be reached, the British Government announced their own policy for Palestine in the White Paper of May, 1939. While reasserting in this Paper their commitment for a 'Jewish home in Palestine', the British Government declared that :

"They would indeed regard it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate, as well as to the assurances which have been given to the Arab people in the past, that the Arab population of Palestine should be made the subjects of a Jewish State against their will."

The British Government also declared that their objective in Palestine was to give self-government to the people and ultimately an independent Palestine State was envisaged :—

"It should be a State in which the two peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews, share an authority in Government in such a way that the essential interests of each are secured."

9. Furthermore, the immigration of the Jewish population was fixed at 75,000 in the next five years. Further Jewish immigration was to be conditional on Arab assent. It was evident by then that paralysis was settling over British policy in Palestine because of contradictory positions taken and assurances given by the British Government to the Arabs and the Jews.

10. After the Second World War the Labour Government announced that the White Paper policy of 1939 was to be continued. The Jews, however, were keen to secure immigration of as many Jews as possible from Eastern Europe. They organized agitations in the United States which led to a plea by President Truman to Britain to permit the immediate entry into Palestine of 1,00,000 Jewish refugees. A joint Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry was established to look into the proposal and advocated the entry of 1,00,000 Jews to Palestine in its report. This proposal was not put into effect due to various political considerations.

11. A federal scheme for Palestine known as the Morrison plan was also under consideration. It would have comprised an Arab province, a Jewish Province, district of Jerusalem and the Nagev. This plan was, however, rejected by all parties. Meanwhile Jewish terrorism was increasing in Palestine and the United Kingdom decided to wash its hands off the problem and submitted it to the United Nations.

12. The General Assembly created the U.N. Special Committee on Palestine which recommended unanimously that the Mandate for Palestine should be terminated and after a very short transitional period independence should be granted to it. UNSCOP also offered two carefully prepared plans for the consideration of the UN : the first, supported by a large majority, offered a plan of partitioning Palestine into Jewish and Arab States, while the second recommended the establishment of a federal State in Palestine.

13. Both plans placed special emphasis on the need for safeguarding the international status of Jerusalem and the nearby places of religious importance. An *ad-hoc* committee on Palestine was

established to consider this report by the General Assembly. The Arabs boycotted its meetings. The *ad-hoc* committee recommended specific dates in 1948 for the complete withdrawal of British forces, for the termination of the Mandate, for the provisional period during which the country would be governed by the committee appointed by the UN General Assembly, and finally, for the establishment of the Arab and Jewish States. A special status was laid down for Jerusalem.

14. On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly passed a resolution recommending a modified scheme of partition on the lines above. The Jews accepted the resolution in principle. The Arab States reiterated their determination to resist any plan of partition, if necessary, by the use of force. In December of the same year the Mandatory Government announced that the termination of the Mandate would take effect as from May 15, 1948 and the withdrawal of British forces would be completed by August 1, 1948. The State of Israel claims to have come into existence on May 15, 1948, the date of termination of the Mandate, and by virtue of the operation of the decision of the United Nations.

15. In the succeeding weeks an ever increasing number of serious clashes occurred in Palestine, resulting in the eventual conflict between Israeli forces and those of the neighbouring Arab States, namely Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt. After a brief period of hostilities between Israel and the neighbouring Arab States, armistice agreements were signed at Rhodes, Greece, under the auspices of the UN Mediator on Palestine and the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission.

2. JORDAN'S ABSORPTION OF ARAB PALESTINE

16. On December 1, 1948, King Abdullah, disregarding the Arab leaders' wishes, unilaterally annexed those areas of Palestine which had been occupied by his Arab legion during the war with Israel, and which had remained under Jordanian control since the armistice between Israel and Jordan. The Jordanian Parliament subsequently passed a resolution on 24th April, 1950, which stated that

the territories on both sides of the River Jordan constitute a single kingdom, guaranteed equal rights to all inhabitants under King Abdullah, as Chief of State, and declared that Arab rights in Palestine would be reassured by all lawful means without prejudice to a final settlement of the Palestine question "on the basis of justice and Arab co-operation."

3. PALESTINE REFUGEES

17. During the strife which occurred before the end of the British Mandate in Palestine and also during the war that followed the departure of the British, in 1948, more than half of the Palestine Arab population was displaced. During the first three months of 1948 the number of refugees was relatively small. However, it reached grave proportions as a result of the massacre of Deir Yassin of April, 1948, and the expulsion by Israel of Arab inhabitants from various areas. In June, 1949 it was reported to the General Assembly that the number of refugees was 9,40,000. By 1973, the figures had risen to 15,40,694. These figures do not include an unspecified number of refugees who either were not registered with the United Nations Relief Agency or were not receiving assistance from it.

18. The General Assembly in Resolution 194 of its third session in 1948 *inter-alia* resolved that "the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at earliest practicable date, and compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which under principles of international law or in equity should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible."

19. This resolution has since provided not only the basis for humanitarian activities of the United Nations concerning the Palestine refugees but also a basis of the stand of Arabs as well as Pakistan with regard to the solution of the refugee problem. However, no action has been effected by Israel on this resolution so far.

20. On the initiative of Israel, Egypt, Trans-Jordan, Lebanon and Syria met at Lausanne on April 27, 1949, with the aim of seeking agreement on the outstanding issues in Palestine notably the future of Arab refugees, the internationalization of Jerusalem, and the demarcation of frontiers. After two months of negotiations, however, the talks broke down and were adjourned, due to a failure to reconcile two diametrically opposed points of view;

- (a) Israel's insistence that the Arab refugee problem and the possibility of the return of many of the refugees to Israeli territory, should be part of the general peace settlement, and
- (b) the insistence of the Arab States that the refugee problem should be dealt with prior to any general political settlement.

21. In a statement on Israeli foreign policy made on June 15th, 1949, in the Israeli Parliament, Mr. Shareyt, the Foreign Minister, declared that Israel was ready to offer every assistance in the resettlement of displaced Arabs, would pay compensation for abandoned lands, would facilitate the re-uniting of families separated by the Arab exodus, and might also accept the return of a certain number of refugees, but made it clear that such steps would not be taken *before a general peace settlement*.

22. As a result of the 1967, hostilities, about 1,80,000 refugees and 2,00,000 newly displaced persons fled from the West Bank and the Gaza strip to East Jordan and about 17,000 Refugees and 1,00,000 Syrians left the occupied Golan Heights for other parts of Syria. This has further compounded the issue. The United Nations has been repeatedly calling upon the Government of Israel to take effective and immediate steps for the return without delay of the displaced persons to their homes and camps without any effect.

23. The Palestinian problem did not find a solution after the inconclusive wars of 1956 and 1967. The Palestinian refugees, denied their rights for such a long time and living in camps, frustrated in their efforts to return to their homeland, denied the right

to work even in Arab countries and being stateless citizens decided to take matters in their own hands and formed guerilla organisations, to obtain their rights.

4. THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION

24. The PLO came into being in 1964 at the Arab Summit meeting in Alexandria. It came under the leadership of Yasser Arafat in February, 1969, when he was elected the Chairman of the Executive Committee of P.L.O. At present the P.L.O. is formed by five major and some minor groups :

- (1) The largest group " Al Fatah ", was created in September, 1965, and is led by Yasser Arafat. This group became extremely popular after its success in the battle of Karame against Israel in 1968. According to Israeli estimates its strength before September, 1970, was about 40,000 but has fallen to about 30,000 since then. Being the largest single Palestinian Organization it includes national elements with every tendency including purely nationalistic, Pro-Chinese leftists and Pro-Soviet Communists etc.
- (2) " As Saiqa ", is led by Zuheer Mohsin and was created with the help of Syria in 1964. It is a pro-Baath (Syrian) leftist organization and according to Israeli estimates has 9,000 men under arms. These are supposed to be regular forces which are financed and armed by Syria.
- (3) " The Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) " is led by Dr. George Habbash. Its Secretary General is Ahmed el Yamani. Its strength is estimated to be about 7,000. It is reputed to be of pro-Chinese communist orientation, although it enjoys good relations with the ruling Baathists of Iraq.
- (4) " The Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) " is led by Naif Hawatimeh, and its strength is estimated to be about 3,500. It consist of both pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese Communists and is supported by the Baathists of Iraq.

- (5) "The Arab Liberation Front" is led by Abdel Wahab Kettani and has an estimated strength of about 9,000. It has mixed tendencies and is supported by the Iraqi Baathists.

25. Besides these, there are a number of smaller groups which are of little consequence.

26. The primary aim of these groups is, of course, the liberation of Palestine. But they differ as to the means to be adopted for the attainment of this objective, in their ideologies and according to the country from which they receive their support. In spite of internal dissensions however, the Palestinians have been able to organise themselves into a viable organisation *i.e.* the PLO led by Mr. Yasser Arafat. All the major Palestinian Liberation Movements are represented in the Executive Council of the PLO. In this sense, the Palestinians do have a representative to speak for them. The Arab Summit at Algiers recognised this fact when they accepted the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.

5. THE RAMADAN WAR AND AFTER

27. After the 1973 October war, a Summit of the Arabs Heads of State was called to discuss the Middle East situation including the question of Palestine. Among other things it was proposed that the Palestinian Liberation Organization should form a provisional Government for Palestine. It was urged that this would transform the organization into an international political entity, which would win immediate recognition from the Socialist, Muslim, and non-aligned countries and secure its representation at the forthcoming peace Conference. Furthermore these attempts would contribute towards the realization of the "legitimate rights of the Palestinians".

28. This move was opposed strongly by the Jordanian delegate who argued that Israel would not accept the PLO at the forthcoming peace talks and that the move would cause a rift in Arab ranks. The views of the Jordanian delegate were not shared by others, and it was decided to set up a sub-committee to

produce a compromise formula which would be laid before the Summit. The Summit felt that any immediate formation of a provisional Palestinian Government might cause a split within Arab ranks, particularly amongst various Palestinian movements, and could also result in the boycott of the Geneva Conference by Jordan. It, therefore, decided to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization as the "Only representative body of the Palestine People." *Jordan opposed the decision and reserved its position.* Mr. Yasser Arafat thus made substantial gains since he now virtually has a mandate from the Arab world to form a Palestine Government, at the appropriate time, and could do so in the near future in consultation with other Palestinian movements.

29. Jordan, which had absorbed the major part of Arab Palestine, has an essentially negative attitude towards the emergence of an Arab Palestinian State. King Hussein did not attend the Summit meeting in view of the presence of Yasser Arafat almost with the status of a Head of State. Last minute efforts by Feisal and Boumediene reportedly failed to get King Hussein of Jordan to attend the meeting.

30. The settlement of the Palestine problem, in the context of a Middle East settlement, presents special difficulties. The Arab States appear to be moving towards the acceptance of the idea of an Independent Arab State in Palestine. The recent Arab Summit asserted in the political Resolution that one of the conditions of peace would be "the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people". The Egyptian Foreign Minister has stated that PLO will participate in the Geneva Peace Conference. King Hussein has waived his objection to PLO's participation in the Geneva peace talks.

6. THE POSITION OF THE FRONT-LINE COUNTRIES

(i) Egypt

31. The Egyptian position on Palestine refugees has always been that their "legitimate" rights must be restored to them. The word legitimate is interpreted to mean that the Palestinians who have been

displaced must be given an option to return to their homes which now lie in Israeli territory. If they do not wish to return they must be compensated properly. This, more or less, has been the position of other Arab Governments also.

32. As regards the creation of a separate Palestinian state the Egyptian Government has not taken any formal position. It has been said occasionally that President Sadaat has been asking Yasser Arafat to establish a Government in exile. However, the situation has not yet crystalized. The PLO itself has not made up its mind on this question.

33. It will be recalled that Egypt broke off diplomatic relations with Jordan when King Hussein proposed his scheme of the United Arab Kingdom with the East and West Bank of Jordan forming two autonomous regions. Egypt saw in this an attempt by Jordan, in collusion with Israel and United States, to undermine the representative status of the PLO. Egypt recognizes the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole representative of the Palestinians. This policy was confirmed recently by the Arab Heads of States during the Summit Conference in Algiers. Despite threats by Jordan that it would not attend any meeting in which PLO was given an official status, Yasser Arafat was given every honour due to a Head of State at Algiers.

34. Very briefly put, the Egyptian position on Palestine would be that whatever is acceptable to the PLO will be acceptable to the Egyptians. It can be argued through involved and technical or legalistic interpretation that the Egyptian position still remains the undoing of Israel since that is the position of the Palestinians. In practice however, Egypt has made it quite clear that by the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians they do not mean the undoing of the State of Israel but only the providing of a choice between return and compensation to the Palestinians. It would be up to the Palestinians to accept the first or the second alternative. Egypt accepts that in any peace conference PLO would represent the Palestinian people independently and exclusively.

(ii) *Jordan's Position*

35. Jordan's views on the Palestinian issue may be summarised as follows :—

- (a) The first thing to negotiate is Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and all other Arab lands occupied since June 5, 1967.
- (b) After the withdrawal has taken place, there will be a plebiscite, under international supervision, enabling the Palestinians to exercise their right of self-determination to decide whether they want to stay with Jordan or form a separate State.
- (c) The plebiscite would embrace all Palestinians "where ever they are", including those in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, the West Bank, the East Bank and Gaza.
- (d) Since Jordan has so far based its stand on Resolution 242, it still interprets the provision regarding withdrawals to imply that the territories should be given back to their former sovereigns/occupants.
- (e) Until a plebiscite is held, neither Jordan nor any other party can speak in the name of the Palestinians. Thus Jordan does not accept the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.
- (f) Jordan accepted, in principle, the US-USSR invitation to attend the Geneva Peace Conference but would not participate if a decision is taken to establish a Palestinian Government in exile, which asks for sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza.
- (g) Jordan, while still claiming sovereignty over Jerusalem and its other territories occupied by Israel, does not any longer claim to be the only representative of the Palestinian people. Jordan does not, therefore, object to the participation of PLO at the Geneva Peace Conference to represent other aspects of the Palestinian rights.

(h) Jordan thinks that the prospects for the formation of a Palestinian Government-in-exile are remote. However, if such a Government is established, Jordan will not resist it since most of the Arab countries are likely to recognise it.

(i) The Jordanians will, in that case, place their hopes in non-cooperation by Israel with such a government-in-exile.

(iii) *Syria's Position*

36. The Syrian Government is of the view on the question of Palestinian national rights that they must be guaranteed. However, Syria would accept any settlement which is acceptable to the PLO.

(iv) *PLO's Position*

37. The Palestinian Liberation Organization is an umbrella for a number of guerilla groups of widely differing shades of political opinion. The various groups also have different ideas on how to pursue their struggle against Israel. The largest group Al-Fatah which is led by Yasser Arafat is mainly nationalist in outlook and tries to avoid taking positions left or right of centre since it believes that the struggle for the liberation of Palestine would require the unity of all Palestinian people.

38. On the extreme left is the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine led by George Habbash which believes that unless the Arab world is overtaken by a socio-economic revolution it will not be possible to effectively solve the Israeli problem. It is their belief that Israel is a manifestation of the weakness and reactionary character of Arab society.

39. Between these two are other groups which are sponsored by various Arab Governments or which follow Marxism in a less extreme form. The PLO is at present confronted with an extremely delicate situation. If they continue to insist upon the dissolution of Israel they are likely to be left out of the settlement process which has already begun in the Middle East. If such a

settlement comes about without the participation of PLO—a remote possibility since President Saadat has clearly stated that Geneva Peace Conference will not move forward without the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization—the PLO will have been written off politically. There is, however, an emerging awareness among the PLO leadership that they may have to come to terms with the existence of Israel if they are to survive as a significant factor in Middle East politics. It would seem that a solution is being sought which would permit the PLO to participate in the Peace Conference as well as retain at least formally its original commitment to the Liberation of occupied Palestine *i.e.* Israel. Jordan, conceding that it is not the only representatives of the Palestinian peoples, has indicated its readiness to accept the participation of PLO at the Geneva Peace Conference.

40. If the PLO does not participate in the Peace Conference they run the risk of leaving the field open to King Hussein to negotiate with Israel on behalf of the West Bank Palestinians. The front line Arab countries as well as Algeria and other like-minded countries would like PLO to be included in the Peace Conference and would probably exert pressure on the PLO to soften its position on the existence of Israel.

41. As regards the question of a separate Palestinian State, there appears to be no consensus amongst the Palestinians on this question. If they accept a separate Palestinian State on the West Bank it would mean the abandoning of the rest of Palestine to Israel. As long as a new attitude towards Israel is not worked out it would not be possible for any Palestinian group to formally endorse the creation of a separate Palestinian State. Even if they do agree to the formation of such a State it would be in the form of a small demilitarized stretch sandwiched between Israel and Jordan. The temptation to form a Government in exile and secure recognition from a large number of countries, to the discomfiture of Jordan, has been resisted by the PLO, for mainly two reasons :

- (a) As long as Israel's position is to vacate the West Bank *only after substantial* readjustments, it is not advisable to have a government-in-exile which may be required

to become a formal party to the negotiations. PLO would prefer to wait till Israel shows its hand regarding the West Bank and the Palestinian State. Accordingly a meeting of the Palestine National Congress, with representatives from the PLO, the West Bank Palestinians and other elements, which was to be held in Cairo this month, has been postponed.

- (b) There is serious disunity within the ranks of the PLO. The second ring leadership feels that the top leaders are being tempted by the prospect of office in their attitude towards a government-in-exile and a Palestinian State on the West Bank and Gaza.

42. It is said that Yasser Arafat who started as a guerilla leader has matured and grown to the stature of a statesman and top negotiator and that he alone has the ability of combining the extreme left and radical Arab nationalists and Palestine nationalists to arrive at a decision acceptable to a large majority.

(v) *Algeria's Stand*

43. Algeria has in the past taken an extremist militant stand. It has opposed any move which might lead to a recognition of Israel and the denial of the rights of the Palestinians to their homeland. It does not accept resolution 242 and has not favourably received resolution 338.

44. The Algerian Government, however, not desiring to weaken Arab solidarity, would not oppose any honourable formula acceptable to Egypt, Syria and the Palestinians.

45. The Algerian Government believes that Jordan has no legitimate claim to the territory on the West Bank which belongs to the people of Palestine, nor in their view is there any justification for a referendum to decide whether the territory becomes independent or is annexed to Jordan. It also upholds that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole representative of the Palestinian people and that Jordan has no right to exercise any control over the Palestinians.

46. As an interim measure Algeria might accept the creation of a State of Palestine comprising the territory on the West Bank including Jerusalem, and connected with Gaza through a corridor. It would thus appear that while Algeria is opposed to the recognition of Israel it seems to have tacitly accepted the fact of the latter's existence.

(vi) *Libya's Stand*

47. It is not clear whether as a temporary measure Libya would favour the establishment of a separate Palestine State on the West Bank of river Jordan. As a long-term measure, according to Libya, the answer to the problem lies in the return of the refugees back to their homes and the return of Jews to their countries of origin.

(vii) *Iran's Stand*

48. The Shahenshah supports the view that the Palestinians have a right to decide their destiny and that if their rights are not respected there will be no peace in the area. However, it is doubtful if he would support the proposal for a separate Palestinian State as he is not likely to go against King Hussein for whom he has great sympathy both as an old friend and as a fellow King.

49. There is, therefore, a possibility that he would support King Hussein's proposal that the Palestinians living on both sides of the river Jordan be given an opportunity to decide their own future through a plebiscite.

(viii) *Other Arab Countries*

50. The other Arab countries of the region would more or less follow the position that whatever is acceptable to the Palestinians would be acceptable to them.

(ix) *Position of Israel*

51. It has been said time and again, particularly by the Jordanians, that Israel might not evacuate the West Bank at all if it was convinced that the West Bank would fall into the hands of Palestine Liberation Organization or could become an independent State of Palestine which would have the support of the

Soviet Union. As such it is claimed that Israel would prefer to negotiate with Jordan which is a pro-West country.

52. While this is quite true, the possibility of Israel, if pushed to the wall, negotiating with PLO cannot be ruled out. For example, at a Seminar held in February, 1973, in Israel, seven former Israeli Chiefs of Staff, well known for their 'hawkish' views, indicated that they might be prepared to acknowledge the Palestine Liberation Organization as the representative of the Palestinian people and even accept the existence of a Palestinian State on the West Bank of Jordan under certain conditions.

53. On the question of refugees Israel's position is that those who have left the country would not be allowed to come back except in certain rare cases but Israel would consider paying compensation to those refugees whose properties have been appropriated by Israel and Israeli citizens.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE CONFERENCE

54. In the past, Pakistan, in the eyes of the Palestinian groups, had been very closely identified with King Hussein. They have resented our military collaboration with Jordan which, in their view, has had the effect of bolstering up the Hashemite regime and encouraging it to use force ruthlessly to crush the Palestinian resistance. However, we have progressively moved away from this one-sided posture. Our military assistance to Jordan has been reduced. We have allowed PLO to open an office in Pakistan although we have made it clear that this does not touch the issue of recognition or non-recognition of P.L.O. as the sole legal representative of the Palestinian people. We have also assured Mr. Yasser Arafat that he will be given honours due to a Head of State when he attends the Islamic Summit. This has been done because Yasser Arafat had indicated that he would stay away if not treated like a Head of State and this in turn could have had negative effects on the participation of Presidents Boumedienne, Qaddafi, Assad and some other leaders. We are cognizant of the Arab Summit decision about P.L.O's status and can not go against the mainstream of Arab thinking.

55. At the same time Pakistan has maintained the closest relations with Jordan which has extended valuable assistance to us during our travail. We have advised Jordan that P.L.O. had been invited in keeping with the past practice of the Islamic Conference and Arafat has to be accorded the treatment of a Head of State as was done at the Algiers Summit.

56. On the question of the refugees our position consistently has been that they must be given the choice of either returning to their homes or opting for compensation as provided in U.N. resolutions. We should continue to uphold this idea. Furthermore we should lend our support to the Palestinian demand for national rights *viz.* the right to exist as a people and a State.

57. A number of participating States like Algeria feel that the Islamic Summit should mark an advance over the Arab Summit. However, Tunisia and Lebanon consider that it would be an achievement if the Islamic Summit could merely endorse the decisions of the Arab Summit. It is quite likely that the radical States would seek recognition of PLO's status as the sole representative of the Palestinian people by the Islamic Summit as well. Jordan would probably not find itself so completely isolated as it was at Algiers. It may expect support from some non-Arab countries such as Iran, Turkey and Indonesia. But, even if their support materialises, it would avail Jordan little in its isolation from fellow Arab States.

58. The P.L.O.-Jordan issue may well arouse great passions. It would not be prudent for Pakistan, as the host country and in view of our bilateral relations, to get embroiled in this controversy. Our best tactics would be to let the two sides ventilate their view in the first instance and then work quietly for conciliation on the ground of need to maintain Arab and Islamic unity. However, if a show-down becomes inevitable, Pakistan should go along with the mainstream of Arab opinion in support the position of the P.L.O.

POSITION PAPERS

JERUSALEM

I. INTRODUCTION

The future of Jerusalem is an integral issue of the Middle East dispute. The importance of Jerusalem cannot be measured in purely economic, strategic or political terms. The City is unique in that some of the most venerated places of Muslim, Christian and Judaic worship are located there. The conflicting claims to the City and even to some of the particular shrines have a history which stretches thousands of years.

II. JERUSALEM IN HISTORY

2. From 1100 B.C. to 400 A.D., Jerusalem passed through Persian, Assyrian, Greek and Roman hands. In the 4th Century A.D., the Roman Empire became wholly Christian. Since then Jerusalem has been under the control of the Christians, briefly the Jews and, for the largest period, of the Muslims.

3. The Christians forbade the Jews from entering the City until the 5th century A.D., although Roman Emperor Julian tried for a brief period, and unsuccessfully, to rebuild the City and restore it to the Jews. In 637, Caliph Omar captured the city and Muslim rule continued till the end of the First World War, except for a brief period (1099—1187) when, in the Crusades, the Christians captured it, massacred Jews and Muslim inhabitants alike and desecrated the Muslim places of worship.

4. Muslim rule in Jerusalem was relatively enlightened and tolerant. When the City came under Ottoman rule, the European powers backed Christian demands relating to Jerusalem. Christians were allowed to retain Holy places, and to return in small numbers. Often, the Turkish Sultans had to adjudicate between the conflicting claims of different Christian sects over the various Christian shrines. In 1957, the Turkish Sultan issued

a Firman, dividing the Christian shrines amongst different sects of that religion. The *status quo* governing the Holy Places, which was the result of this measure is, with some modifications, still in effect, although the different sects are still quarrelling as to its interpretation. In the 1830's, Muhammed Ali of Egypt even allowed the Anglicans to build a modern church in the city. The question of administration of Holy Places became intertwined with the "Eastern Question" during the 19th century and was one of the causes of the Crimean War. Both by the Peace of Paris (1856) and the Congress of Berlin (1878), religious equality and liberty were guaranteed throughout the Turkish Empire. About Jerusalem, the two treaties specifically provided that the *status quo ante* must be preserved. In comparison with the Christians, the Jews were not treated so favourably by the Turks. Muhammad Ali, however, allowed them to recover a medieval synagogue. During the rest of the 19th century, the Jews were allowed to build a few synagogues. The first Jewish colony in Palestine was set up in 1882.

5. Since that time the fate of Jerusalem has been linked to that of Palestine as a whole. The goal of the Zionist movement "to create a home for the Jewish people in Palestine" was inspired by a feeling of religious distinction. The political objective of creating a Jewish State was subsidiary to the aim of establishing this State or "national home" in Palestine—the 'promised land'. Thus, although Hertzl had accepted the British offer to create the Jewish State in Uganda in 1903, this was rejected by the Zionists after his death. Moreover, in Palestine the prize was Jerusalem—a city which symbolised the revivalist aspirations of the Zionists.

6. Even at the time they succumbed to the Zionist pressure, the British were aware that the religious overtones of the Zionist objectives could produce an inflammable situation. The Balfour Declaration, while viewing "with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people", provided that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine."

III. JERUSALEM UNDER THE BRITISH MANDATE

7. After the Allied victory in the First World War, Islam's 1300 hundred year rule over Jerusalem ended. Palestine was mandated to Britain in 1920. Under the mandate "all responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine" was "assumed by the mandatory" which was "responsible solely to the League of Nations." This did not, however, confer "authority to interfere with the upkeep and management of purely Muslim sacred shrines, the immunities of which are also guaranteed." (Article 13 of the Mandate—Annexure 'A'). The mandate also provided "complete freedom of conscience", the duty to safeguard the religious rights of all inhabitants of Palestine, only such control over religious bodies as was required for the "maintenance of public order and good government", and the establishment of a Commission to determine rights and claims over Holy Places of the different religious communities.

8. The provisions of the mandate were viewed with less than equanimity by the Arabs. For the mandate was conferred on Britain in contravention of her promises of independence to the Arabs. Moreover, the Balfour Declaration was made part of the mandate which caused the Arabs to view the whole system with suspicion. The Jews had gradually begun to assert their claims to various Holy Places whereas the Arabs favoured retention of the *Status Quo*.

9. The Palestinian resistance to the Zionist programme of expanding their share of land and population in the territory, coalesced with their resistance to British rule and resulted in the "rebellions" of the 1920, 1921, 1929, 1933, 1936 and 1937—39. Of these, two major clashes were over the control of the "Wailing Wall", also known as the Western Wall of the Haram al-Sharif.

10. The Peel Commission, which was formed after the second of these clashes, suggested that Jerusalem should be a neutral zone between a Jewish State, created out of one part of Palestine, and Transjordan with which the rest of Palestine should be assimilated.

The Woodhead Commission (1938) suggested that Jerusalem should be an enclave under League Mandate with a corridor connecting it with the Mediterranean. The Arab Higher Committee rejected both schemes as they contained plans for partition.

IV. THE U.N.'S PARTITION PLAN—TERRITORIAL INTERNATIONALIZATION OF JERUSALEM

11. The Palestine question came up before the United Nations in May, 1947. The Arab countries opposed its consideration, and the establishment of the Special Committee. The Committee visited Palestine in June, 1947. The Arab Higher Committee refused to collaborate with it. The Special Committee submitted its report in August, 1947 and presented two alternative plans for the solution of the Palestine problem.

12. Under the majority Plan, Palestine was to be divided into an Arab State and a Jewish State and Jerusalem was to be internationalised under U.N. auspices. The minority Plan (submitted by India, Iran and Yugoslavia) recommended the creation of an independent Federal State of Palestine, comprising of an Arab State and a Jewish State with a large degree of local powers. There was to be a single Palestinian nationality, guarantees for the rights of minorities and free access to Holy Places. Jerusalem was to be the Capital of the State.

13. On 29 November, 1947, the General Assembly adopted the Majority Partition Plan with Economic Union. The Arab State was to comprise 42.88% of the area of Palestine; the Jewish State 56.47% and the international zone of Jerusalem was 0.65% or 68 square miles.

14. With regard to Jerusalem, the Partition Plan provided the following arrangements :

- (i) Jerusalem was to have a special international status and would be administered by the Trusteeship Council on behalf of United Nations. The Governor of Jerusalem

was to be a person who was not a citizen of either the Jewish or the Arab State and was to be appointed by the Trusteeship Council. A special police force was to be recruited from amongst foreigners.

- (ii) Jerusalem was to have a virtually sovereign status. The Governor was authorized to conduct the external affairs of the city. The city government was to provide for the consular protection of the citizens. Residents of Jerusalem acquired the citizenship of Jerusalem and not of the neighbouring states. The only restriction on the sovereign status was that it had to be demilitarised and neutralized.
- (iii) Holy places were to be preserved and protected and full access to these places was to be conceded to all religious communities. Freedom of worship was guaranteed. Existing rights of various communities were not to be denied or restricted.
- (iv) A Declaration, to be made by both the neighbouring states, would provide that in so far as the Holy Places are concerned, liberty of access and transit shall be guaranteed to each state and residents of the city. The Governor was to see that rules relating to Holy Places were being observed.
- (v) These provisions were to become applicable on 1st October, 1948. Ten years from then, a referendum would be held and citizens of Jerusalem would be allowed to change the statute.

V. THE OUTCOME OF THE 1948 WAR

15. The adoption of the Partition Resolution in the UN touched off protest and disturbances in Palestine. This developed into an open three cornered conflict between the Arabs Jews and the British's attempts to maintain order met with diminishing success. In the meantime, it was preparing to evacuate from the territory.

The Security Council considered the situation without concrete result. The General Assembly convened at the request of the United States, appointed a mediator to "use his good offices" to "promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation in Palestine".

16. On 14th May, 1948, the British High Commissioner left Palestine and the British Mandate formally ended. On the same date the Jewish State was proclaimed and a provisional government formed. On the following day the Arab States instituted armed action in Palestine.

17. The Partition Plan was never implemented and by the end of the war, Israel had extended its area beyond that specified in the plan. Jerusalem was divided—the old city containing most of the Holy Places came under Jordanian control, while the rest of the city was occupied by the Jews.

18. During the fighting, the General Assembly asked the Trusteeship Council to study, with Britain and other parties, suitable measures for the protection of the city and its inhabitants [(No. 185) S-2) of 26th April, 1948]. Discussions in the Council showed that the Arabs were opposed to the stationing of 1000 foreign policemen in Jerusalem, or to placing it under International Trusteeship. The Jewish Agency for Palestine favoured the adoption of some of the provisions of the Draft Statute for restoring law and order contained in the Partition Plan. The Arabs opposed this as well since it could be interpreted as an acceptance of the Partition Plan. The only matter which could be agreed upon was to cease-fire and an undertaking by both parties that the Holy Places would be safeguarded and respected.

19. After its seizure of the New City of Jerusalem in 1948, Israel sought to annex it and named it as its Capital. The United Nations, however, did not recognise this nor concede that Israel had acquired sovereignty over any part of the Holy Places. For its part, Jordan too assumed control over the Old City and exercised *de facto* sovereignty over it and those parts of Palestine it had occupied.

VI. FUNCTIONAL INTERNATIONALIZATION

20. On December 11, 1948, the General Assembly adopted resolution 194 (III) which asked the Palestine Commission to pursue the following general lines in drafting the Instrument establishing a Permanent International Regime for the Jerusalem area :

- (i) Jerusalem was to be accorded a " Special and Separate Treatment from the rest of the Palestine " and was to be placed " under active UN control ".
- (ii) Distinctive groups within Jerusalem were to be given maximum local autonomy.
- (iii) Pending agreement on more detailed arrangements, the freest possible access to Jerusalem by road, rail or air should be accorded to all inhabitants of Palestine.

21. The Instrument proposed by the Commission, in departure from the Partition Plan, would have denied Jerusalem the status of " Corpus Seperatum ". The powers not reserved for the UN Commission by the Instrument, were delegated to Arab and Jewish Municipal authorities. The Arab and Jewish zones were regarded as part of Jordan and Israel.

22. The Commissioner was to ensure the protection of existing rights and free access to Holy Places. He was also to supervise demilitarisation and neutralization of the Jerusalem area. Among the institutions to be established were :

- (a) A General Council composed of equal number of Jews and Arabs to protect the Holy Places.
- (b) The International Tribunal to settle dispute between the two zones, and between the Commission and zones.
- (c) A Mixed Tribunal to hear cases involving Arabs in the Jewish zone and Jews in the Arab zone.

23. Israel favoured the concept of Functional Internationalization since the Old City was then under Jordanian Control. It was also supported by the Protestant States. The majority of States, including the Arabs, were, however, opposed to it. The General Assembly, therefore, adopted resolution 303 (IV) which reaffirmed the concept of "Corpus Seperatum".

24. The Arab States (and Pakistan) voted *for* this resolution. They preferred territorial to functional Internationalisation since the latter would leave West Jerusalem with Israel. U.S.A., U.K. and Israel voted against Resolution 303 (IV).

25. Subsequently, the Trusteeship Council drew up another plan for Territorial Internationalisation but this was rejected by both Israel and Jordan. The Council then reported to the General Assembly that it was taking no further action. In the General Assembly debate, a Swedish draft proposed Functional Internationalisation, while Belgium's draft proposed Territorial Internationalisation. Neither formula was adopted for, while the majority favoured Territorial Internationalisation, both Jordan and Israel opposed this.

VII. THE 1967 WAR—ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF JERUSALEM

26. Israel occupied the old city of Jerusalem on June 6, 1967. It took a number of legislative and administrative measures to annex the City. Israeli law has been made applicable to the Old City and Jordanian Laws repealed. Israeli curriculum is now enforced in Arab schools. Arab firms must be registered with Israeli courts. The Municipal laws of Jerusalem can be extended by a simple procedure, under which another 2,600 acres of land have been acquired for the city.

27. Israel has sought to assure that freedom of access to and preservation and freedom of worship in the Holy Places would be "guaranteed to all communities" and that the internal administration of these places would be left to the religious leaders. This is not, however, the case. Although Arabs living in Israel and the

occupied territories can pray at the Al-Aqsa Mosque, other Muslims cannot. Moreover, the Al-Aqsa incident indicates that the measures for the protection of the Holy Places are not adequate. For example, excavations are taking place close to Al-Aqsa which could endanger the mosque. Arabs allege that Israel plans to demolish Harm al-Sharif and Al-Aqsa Mosque and to build a Jewish temple there.

28. The City is needed being slowly but surely de-Arabised. Through various devices, Arabs are being forced to leave the City. Arab social and religious organisations have been asked to close offices and to move to Ramallah. Property belonging to Arabs who had moved out after the 1967 war is now vested in a Custodian. Apartment Houses are being constructed over land formerly belonging to Arabs, and Jews are allowed to occupy them. Israel's policy is to surround the Arab quarter with housing blocks for Jewish immigrants, hoping in this way to create a *fait accompli* which would forestall any move for Israeli withdrawals.

VIII. JERUSALEM IN THE UNITED NATIONS SINCE 1967

29. The General Assembly and the Security Council have unanimously upheld the view that Jerusalem cannot be annexed by Israel. In its resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V), the General Assembly declared invalid the measures taken by Israel to change the status of Jerusalem and called upon it to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of the Holy City. These resolutions were initiated and piloted by Pakistan.

30. The Security Council in resolution 250 (1968) called upon Israel to refrain from holding a military parade in Jerusalem and in resolution 251 (1968) deeply deplored "the holding by Israel of the military parade in Jerusalem on 2nd May, 1968, in disregard of the unanimous decision adopted by the Council." Both these resolutions were sponsored by Pakistan. Resolution 252 (1968) of the Council, in its preambular part, reaffirmed that "acquisition of territory by military force is inadmissible". It considered that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel,

including expropriation of land and properties thereon, which tended to change the legal status of Jerusalem were invalid and could not change that status. It also urgently called upon Israel to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action which would tend to change the status of Jerusalem. These resolutions were also sponsored by Pakistan. On 3 July, 1969, the Council confirmed its previous decisions and censured "in the strongest terms all measures taken to change the status of the city of Jerusalem".

31. In response to the Security Council's desire to be informed by Israel of its intentions with regard to the implementation of the resolution, Israel took the position that it was inconceivable that Jerusalem should be torn apart again or that any international interest could be served by pressing for the dismemberment of the Holy City.

32. The Security Council was reactivated in the wake of the fire which occurred on 21 August, 1969 in Al-Aqsa Mosque in the Old City of Jerusalem and caused extensive damage to the building. In a communication addressed to the Secretary General, representatives of 21 Muslim countries (including Pakistan) drew attention to the act of arson against one of Islam's Holiest Shrines which they said aggravated further the threat to peace. They asked for an impartial investigation, measures to prevent a recurrence of such acts of vandalism and that the representatives of Islamic countries be enabled to assess the damage to the Al-Aqsa Mosque and to prepare and execute plans for its repairs.

33. These views were expressed again a week later in a meeting of the Security Council convened at the request of the 21 Muslim countries. Their spokesman, the representative of Indonesia, emphasised that the fire at Al-Aqsa could not be separated from the military occupation of Jerusalem.

34. In its resolution 271 (1969) of September 15, 1969, the Security Council underlined the danger to peace and security posed by such acts and condemned Israel's failure to comply with the

U.N. resolutions. It also called upon Israel to scrupulously observe the provisions of the Geneva Convention and International Law governing military occupation, and to refrain from causing any hindrance to the discharge of the Arab functions of the supreme Muslim Council of Jerusalem, including any action that the Council might desire from countries with predominantly Muslim populations and from Muslim communities in relation to its plans for the maintenance and repair of the Islamic Holy Places in Jerusalem. In response to the Secretary-General's request for information, Israel charged that the Council's resolution was designed by the Arabs to exploit the fire in Al-Aqsa for propaganda purposes and to excite religious passions throughout the Muslim World.

35. In September, 1971 the Council met again at Jordan's request to consider the question of Jerusalem. Jordan requested this meeting because of news that Israel was contemplating new legislation to extend the borders of Jerusalem to include 30 more Arab towns and villages. Jordan said this constituted a threat to the character of Jerusalem and to international peace and security. The Security Council adopted resolution 298 (1971) which reaffirmed its previous decisions and requested the Secretary-General to report within 60 days on their implementation. The Secretary-General suggested that a 3-member mission of the Council be sent to report on this. However, he subsequently reported his inability to fulfil the mandate because there was no indication that Israel was willing to comply with the resolution.

IX. THE DECISIONS OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE ON JERUSALEM

36. The arson at Al-Aqsa mobilised Muslim concern over Jerusalem and led to the convening of the First Islamic Summit in Rabat in September, 1969. The communique issued at Rabat said that Jerusalem "should be restored to its status previous to June, 1967.....". It warned that any solution which would deny Jerusalem the status it had before that time would be rejected by the Muslim States.

37. The First Islamic Conference of Foreign Minister condemned Israel's refusal "to rescind the measures tending to annex the Holy City of Jerusalem and to change its status." It urged the Security Council to secure respect for its resolutions pertaining to Al-Aqsa Mosque and Jerusalem.

38. The Second Foreign Ministers' Conference "reaffirmed the resolutions of the Rabat Summit Conference" and the Jeddah Foreign Ministers Conference. It also "noted the support given by Christians to the defence of the sanctity of Holy Places".

39. The Third Conference adopted a specific declaration entitled "Judaisation of Jerusalem". It reaffirmed "its commitment to the resolution" of the First Islamic Summit concerning Jerusalem. It hailed the steadfastness of the people of Jerusalem and for their "heroic stand before the plans of expulsion and judaisation, and for their defence of their legacy and sacred institutions". It called for the implementation of U.N. resolutions "connected with Jerusalem".

40. The Fourth (and last) Conference of Foreign Ministers in Benghazi adopted a specific resolution on Jerusalem. This stressed the necessity of implementing U.N. resolutions which "call upon Israeli occupying authorities to put an end to the measures taken to annex and judaise the Holy City and change its religious and historical character." It further hailed the heroism of the population of Jerusalem and requested the implementation of U.N. resolutions on Jerusalem.

X. ISRAEL'S POSITION ON JERUSALEM

41. On Jerusalem, Israel's position appears to be as intransigent as ever after 1967. On 30 December, 1973, Mrs. Golda Meir said that Israel was ready for a territorial compromise with the Arabs, but reiterated that it could not agree to the division of Jerusalem. Two days prior to this, Moshe Dayan, the Israeli Defence Minister, said "Israel should not hesitate to extend the city limits of Jerusalem as far South as Bethlehem, if necessary, so

as to be able to settle new refugees there—Jerusalem 'is more than the capital of Israel. It is a symbol of the nation and the people of Israel'. Israel would never allow "others to instal themselves in its place in Jerusalem".

42. These were, of course, election eve pronouncements but they and others are in line with Israel's oft-stated position. There are, however, some indications that the Israel may be under pressure from the U.S. to accept some form of internationalization of Jerusalem—a possibility which has been advocated in the columns of such a pro-Jewish Journal as the New York Times. Israel may be willing to allow some form of Arab presence and control over the Muslim Holy Places. It may, perhaps, even be willing to agree to some form of functional internationalization so long as Israeli sovereignty and control continues over the City. For the present, at least, it is generally conceded that Israel will be most dogmatically opposed to returning to the pre-1967 status or any other form of Arab control over East Jerusalem, leave alone the whole city.

XI. THE POSITION OF THE SUPER POWERS

43. As stated earlier, the United States supported the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions denying legitimacy to Israel's attempts to annex the Holy City. Yet, so far it has not stated its position unequivocally as to how she views the future status of Jerusalem. Up until recently, the United States had not found fit to exercise any persuasion with Israel to relinquish its control over the City. It is rumoured that the U.S. has, in the wake of the 1973 war, discussed a 'formula' with the Soviet Union. This, it is believed, envisages a united Jerusalem under Israeli control but with an Arab administration of East Jerusalem and Arab and Christian control over their respective Holy Places. In case this is found to be unacceptable to the Arabs, the U.S. may perhaps go so far as to suggest Vatican Status. Domestic compulsions would not allow it to go much further. The United States considers

that Jerusalem will be a most difficult problem to resolve and would like it to be discussed towards the end of the Geneva Peace Talks.

44. The Soviet Union has consistently called for Israeli withdrawals from *all* Arab territories occupied since the 1967 war. It is said, however, to favour internationalization of Jerusalem in some form and "has not raised any major objections" to the U.S. plan. How this could be reconciled with the requirement for withdrawal from all occupied territories is not clear.

XII. THE POSITIONS OF ARAB AND MUSLIM COUNTRIES ABOUT THE FUTURE OF JERUSALEM

45. The Arab position on Jerusalem is expressed in the resolution of the recent Arab Summit which called for the withdrawal of Israel from all occupied territories, "in the first place Jerusalem". The Arab Summit also considered Israeli withdrawal from Jerusalem as a "paramount and unchangeable" condition for peace in the Middle East.

46. This position reflected the dominance of the Saudi Arabian viewpoint. In fact, King Faisal has emerged in the role of guardian of Islamic places of worship. King Faisal is said to have impressed upon Dr. Kissinger that the problem of Jerusalem must be resolved and that "Arab sovereignty over Jerusalem must take precedence over the withdrawal of the Israeli occupation from the West Bank of the Jordan river". He will most likely insist that East Jerusalem if not the whole of the City be returned to the Arabs.

47. Behind the unanimous support to the Algiers formula, there are subtle differences among the Arabs. Jordan insists that Arab Jerusalem must be given up by Israel in favour of Jordanian sovereignty. Proposals such as Jordan being given Auqaf and Administrative control over the holy places without any sovereignty are unacceptable to it. Jordan may agree to Israel's insistence on a unified city in the sense of free access between East and West

Jerusalem, provided East Jerusalem is returned to its sovereignty. In this case it may agree to international supervision over Holy Places and demilitarization of Jerusalem in the initial phase.

48. It may be noted that the formula so far adopted in the U.N. resolutions and by and large affirmed in the Islamic Conferences is return of Jerusalem to the pre-1967 status, which, in turn, implies Jordanian control. This formula was generally acceptable at a time when the possibility of creating a Palestinian State on the West Bank was unlikely. The creation of a Palestinian State is now quite probable. To meet this point, the more radical among the Arab States deny that Jordan has the right to resume control of the West Bank and, therefore, over Jerusalem. This is the position of Algeria, Libya, Tunisia and Egypt. Even Morocco and Saudi Arabia, in accepting the Palestine Liberation Organization as the "sole representative of the Palestinian people" have by implication accepted this position.

49. The only other source of support for the Jordanian position is outside the Arab world *i.e.* Iran. The Shahanshah is not likely to support the creation of the Palestinian State. He maintains, however, that Jerusalem must be restored to the Muslims. The Shah has been reported as having told Dr. Kissinger that "it was unacceptable to Iran that Islamic Holy Places in Jerusalem remain in non-Islamic hands".

50. While the Egyptians and Syrians support the Saudi Arabian insistence on Israeli evacuation of Jerusalem, in practice they would probably be agreeable to the internationalization of East Jerusalem alone leaving West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in exchange for Israeli concessions on withdrawals from their territories. The Egyptians believe that Jerusalem should be one of the last problems to be tackled at the Geneva Peace Talks.

51. The Kuwaitis draw a fine distinction for the restoration of Jerusalem as an "Arab City" in preference to a "Muslim City". This is, so as not to give the Israelis an excuse to separate Christian Holy Places from Islamic Holy Places thereby denying to the Arabs the right to govern the whole of Arab Jerusalem.

52. The Lebanese, pulled by domestic politics in different directions, are ambivalent on the future status of Jerusalem. The Lebanese Government insists that resolution 242 of the Security Council covers Israeli withdrawal from Jerusalem. However, it is believed that Lebanon may have promised the U.S. that it will support internationalization of Jerusalem. Internationalization, for the U.S., would cover only East Jerusalem, seized by Israel in 1967—not West Jerusalem which Israel would be allowed to retain.

53. The internationalization of Jerusalem has been advocated by the Greek Orthodox Patriarch—who was recently received by President Franjeh of Lebanon. It has also been suggested by the Pope. President Numeiry recently initiated a move to harmonise Christian and Arab positions. Numeiry met the Pope last December with Haile Selassie and the Lebanese Prime Minister. The communique issued after the meeting stressed that there should be no military domination of any one religion over the Holy City and any solution of the problem must take into consideration the rights and aspirations of the followers of three divine faiths.

XIII. THE ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

1. *Continued Israeli Control*

54. This is the Israeli position. It may agree to some sort of international advisory commission to represent religious and other interests. This would hardly satisfy Muslim or Christian opinion because for them the real issue is Jewish control of their Holy Places.

2. *Functional Internationalization under Israeli Control*

55. This option which seems to be preferred by the U.S. envisages Israeli sovereignty over the City, but Muslim or Arab control over their Holy Places under some international arrangements, with full guarantees of access. This option would not be too different from the one above.

3. *Functional Internationalization between Israel and Jordan or authorities of a new Palestinian State.*

56. This option would be very similar to the Plan proposed by the U.N.'s Palestine Commission in 1947 (paragraph 20—24

above), leaving West Jerusalem with Israel and East Jerusalem with Jordan or a Palestinian Government if one is established on the West Bank. This may be acceptable to most of the Arabs if Israel makes territorial concessions on other sectors. It may not be acceptable to Saudi Arabia. Nor would Libya agree to this as it would imply acceptance of Israel's existence and a departure from the goal of eventual unification of Palestine.

4. *Vatican Status*

57. This would give Jerusalem the status of a micro-State, with limited powers to conduct its external relations, maintain its own police force etc. The Pope has consistently supported the 1947 U.N. resolution for internationalization of Jerusalem and the Holy Places in Palestine. He reiterated the Vatican position in his meeting with the 4-nation African delegation on 22 December, 1973. The National Council of Churches has also called for an "international presence" in Jerusalem.

58. There are, however, certain problems regarding this option. For example, the Vatican City depends on Italy for defence and other amenities. With which State—Israel or the Arab—would the administration of Jerusalem enter into agreements relating to guarantees for defence and non-intervention? Also, the Vatican is headed by the Pope, who is also responsible for temporal administration. How would the person or body which is to govern Jerusalem be selected and who would resolve the differences that may arise between the various religious communities represented in such a government? Finally, would the whole of Jerusalem come under the Vatican arrangements or only East Jerusalem? All these problems make it most unlikely that such an arrangement could be rendered acceptable to all sides and practicable at the same time.

5. *"Corpus Separatum" or territorial internationalization*

59. This was visualized in the General Assembly's resolution 181 (II) which partitioned Palestine. Apart from Saudi Arabia and Libya this may be acceptable to most of the Arab and Muslim countries, especially if a Muslim, perhaps from a non-Arab country,

is appointed by the U.N. as the City's Administrator. Although this option would guarantee right of access to both the Israelis and Arabs, it would be strongly opposed by Israel. Col. Qaddafi would also oppose it as would King Faisal of Saudi Arabia.

6. Return to pre-1967 status

60. As stated above, this is the formula adopted by the Arab and Muslim States in most of their positions on Jerusalem. It includes, basically, two options : first, return of East Jerusalem to Jordan ; and second, the more recent possibility, return to a Palestinian State established on the West Bank of the Jordan. The justification for the call for return to the pre-1967 status lies in the general provision of Security Council resolution 242 for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the six day war. This resolution was of course not accepted by some of the Arab States *e.g.* Algeria, Syria, Libya ; even Lebanon says that it "approves" this resolution but, as a non-party to the conflict, is not called upon to "accept" it. This option is, nevertheless, the highest common denominator among the Arabs and will most likely be their initial position at the Geneva Peace Talks.

XIV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PAKISTAN'S POLICY AT THE LAHORE ISLAMIC SUMMIT

61. It is not practicable nor politic for Pakistan to work for a 'realistic' approach to the question of Jerusalem at the Summit. It is difficult at this stage to foresee how far the positions of the various parties involved in the Geneva negotiations will undergo change. This will depend on the other interlinked issues concerning Israeli withdrawals and Palestinian rights. A 'realistic' proposal by the Summit may only encourage Israel to harden its position while weakening the negotiating position of the Arabs. It is recommended that the Pakistan delegation work for a decision or proclamation which strongly supports the general Arab position. A strong declaration on Jerusalem would not only please King Faisal and most of the Arab States, it may also improve the possibilities for

Egypt and Syria to obtain concessions from Israel on withdrawals from their territories. Such a declaration would also be expected by public opinion in Pakistan.

62. Jerusalem is also the one issue on which Pakistan can safely take an initiative at the Summit without the danger of offending any of the Arab countries, despite their differing views about the City's future. It is, therefore, proposed that Pakistan propose a specific resolution on Jerusalem at the Summit provided a consensus can be promoted as to its content. Such a resolution would be based on the decisions of the previous Islamic Conferences and the Arab Summit in Algiers.

POSITION PAPER

THE GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

I. INTRODUCTION

The Geneva Peace Conference, presently being attended by Egypt, Jordan and Israel (Syria has not yet agreed to participate) is an outcome of several realizations by the main combatants. It indicates their acceptance of political, military and economic constraints of the situation. It is a reflection of the changed realities in a region tortured by twenty five years of periodic and bloody conflict.

2. The October war, along with the question mark it has posed about the myth of Israeli invincibility, has convinced the United States that Israel by itself cannot maintain the post 1967 *status quo* in the Middle East. The United States has realised that if the basic Middle East questions which agitate the concerned parties are not resolved, the hope for peace would remain chimerical : the present situation contains the seeds of a renewed military conflagration which might put intolerable strains on U.S. detente with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is likewise interested in a Middle East settlement—its newly evolving structure of a relationship with the U.S., based as it is, on increasing trade and economic cooperation, would collapse were it forced by an escalation of fighting to adopt a renewed posture of confrontation with the U.S.

3. The Arab front line nations, Egypt and Syria, went to war in order to activate big power interest in a settlement. The Peace Conference is therefore seen as a concrete manifestation of the realisation of that objective. Their military performance, coupled with the united Arab oil embargo, has succeeded in bringing the urgency of the problem to the door steps of the United States and most West European nations. For Israel, the Arab military performance could not but have come as an unpleasant shock,

for it has put paid to its vast confidence in its military capability in keeping the Arabs cowed. It has produced the realisation that its security, nay its very existence, would continue to be threatened unless it comes to a negotiated settlement with its Arab neighbours. For the first time the events sparked by the War in the Middle East have produced a meeting where the combatants are in direct contact with one another.

II. BACKGROUND

4. The Arabs and the Israelis have interpreted Resolution 242 very differently. The Arabs construe Resolution 242 to require Israel's withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied as a result of the 1967 war. The Israelis, however, interpret this Resolution to be no more than a framework of general principles for a negotiated settlement. The Arabs accepted the French version of the text of this Resolution which mentions "les territoires". Israel has maintained that the omission of the definite article, "the", from before the word, "territories" meant that a full withdrawal from all the occupied territories was not called for and that its claim to "secure and recognized boundaries" was acknowledged in this Resolution. It wanted therefore to negotiate with the Arabs what its secure frontiers should be, before agreeing to withdraw to these frontiers. It would never withdraw to the 1967 positions. (The text of the Resolution 242 is at annexure I. For a list of annexures to this position paper please see the last page).

4.A. While Resolution 242 was deliberately kept vague to secure agreement, Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973 calls upon, "the parties concerned to start immediately after the ceasefire in the *implementation* of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) *in all of its parts*." This Resolution further stated that "immediately and concurrently with the ceasefire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East." The agreement of the Arabs to attend the Geneva Conference was elicited because of the call on the part of the United Nations *for the implementation* of Resolution 242. The United States now stands.....

committed to the implementation of Resolution 242 in all its parts. It envisages withdrawals by Israel and security guarantees to Israel to be the essential components of a peace settlement.

III. THE ARAB SUMMIT AT ALGIERS

5. The Arab Summit at Algiers in November, 1973, which was attended by Arabs Heads of State except King Hussain of Jordan, Col. Qaddafi of Libya and President Bakr of Iraq, adopted a political declaration which reflects a united Arab stand on questions relating to the Middle East. The political declaration stated :

“the present ceasefire is not peace which can only be achieved by the realisation of two essential conditions, namely, evacuation by Israel of all the occupied Arab territories, in the first place Jerusalem, and restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. As long as these conditions are not met the situation would remain explosive and lead to fresh confrontation.”

The Arab Summit arrived at the consensus that the reality of the situation in the Middle East called for an attempt at a negotiated settlement within the framework of Arab objectives of Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories occupied in June 1967 (including Jerusalem) and the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Although some radical States at Algiers were opposed to Arab participation in the Geneva talks, the Arab leaders decided to go along with the wishes of moderate states like Egypt who wanted to participate in the Conference. It is understood that after considerable discussions among themselves the Arab leaders, on King Faisal's insistence, agreed that the pre-June 1967 status of Jerusalem was not negotiable under any circumstances but that there was room for minor adjustments in some other sectors of the Arab-Israeli frontiers.

6. The other important decision taken by the Arab Summit was its recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organisation as the sole representative Organisation of the Palestinian people, and of

its President, Yasser Arafat, as its Chief spokesman. King Hussain had earlier threatened to boycott the Summit if the Arabs gave head of State treatment to Yasser Arafat. The Arabs decided to ignore King Hussain's demand. Arafat now has the mandate—if one was needed—from the major Arab nations to form a Palestinian Government and he might do so at an appropriate time in consultation and cooperation with other Palestinian movements. The Arab leaders appear optimistic that the US and Western Europe are likely to pressurise Israel to agree to a negotiated settlement acceptable to the Arabs, because of :

- (a) Their military capabilities as demonstrated during the October war,
- (b) their Unity, and
- (c) the effectiveness of the oil weapon.

IV. ATTITUDES OF FRONTLINE COUNTRIES TOWARDS GENEVA CONFERENCE

A. Egypt

7. The Egyptians regard both United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, as providing an adequate framework for a permanent settlement. The Egyptians and Israelis, as mentioned in para 4 above, differ on their interpretation of Resolution 242 concerning withdrawal. The Egyptian view is however supported by the vast majority of U.N. members. In support of their view they emphasise the fact that the introductory paragraphs of Resolution 242 specifically state "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" and therefore it makes mandatory upon Israel to withdraw from *all* territories occupied by force. The Egyptians do not interpret the phrase "secure and recognised boundaries" as requiring any territorial adjustment; they simply concede that it only implies a willingness to accord *de facto* recognition to Israel. According to the Egyptians, Resolution 338 is consistent with Resolution 242 because it calls for the *implementation* of the latter. The Israelis, it may be reiterated, have all along argued that UN Resolution 242 is not self implementing and that therefore the parties concerned would have to negotiate its implementation.

8. The declared Egyptian position on the question of future boundaries and Palestinian refugees is clear. Egypt will not cede any part of its territory to another state. It calls for the restoration of the "legitimate" rights of the refugees and supports the creation of a Palestinian state. The Palestinians must be given an opportunity to return to their homes which now lie within Israeli territory or alternatively they should be compensated for the loss of this right of return.

9. With regard to the future of Jerusalem and the Holy Places, the Egyptian view on this question is covered by its insistence that Israel must vacate all territories occupied by it in 1967. Although for the moment they go along with the Saudi Arabian stand on Jerusalem, they may agree to the internationalization of East Jerusalem in return for total Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory.

B. Syria

10. The Syrians have always adopted a more uncompromising stand *vis-a-vis* Israel than the Egyptians. They did not accept Resolution 242. However, without explicitly saying so, they have accepted Resolution 338. This acceptance is apparently based on a Soviet guarantee conveyed through President Sadaat, that Israel would withdraw from all occupied Arab territories. The Syrians lay emphasis on :

- (a) complete withdrawal from all occupied territories, and
- (b) guaranteeing of the national rights of the Palestinians (as enunciated by the PLO).

Syria is understood to have emphasised to Dr. Kissinger (during his visit in November) that it would refuse to accept any settlement in the Middle East which falls short of a complete Israeli withdrawal from Arab occupied lands and restoration of the national rights of the Palestinians. It did not acquiesce in Kissinger's suggestions of troop disengagement and partial withdrawal in the first phase in return for the release of Israeli prisoners of war by Syria and the easing of the Arab oil embargo. The Syrians have refused to attend the

Geneva Peace Conference because they feel that instead of deliberating upon central issues the Conference would concentrate on insignificant and peripheral matters with the objective of "liquidating the essential questions" such as the evacuation of all Arab territories occupied by Israel and the restoration of the rights of self-determination of the Palestinian people. However, there is reason to believe that the Syrian refusal to attend the inaugural Session of the Geneva Conference is only a tactical move. If the negotiations at Geneva proceed well, Syria will decide to join them at a later stage. Observers feel that the absence of Syria from the Geneva Peace Conference could also be the result of Soviet Union's advice. Apparently the latter wishes to keep its options open and to assure for itself room for manoeuvre.

11. President Sadaat has emphasised the importance of talks between Israel and Syria regarding disengagement of forces, saying that the Geneva Peace Conference could not restart as long as there was no agreement between them. On his arrival in Washington after his third trip to the Middle East, Dr. Kissinger said that real progress had been made towards bringing about dis-engagement talks between Israel and Syria. The Syrians are bent upon utilising the question of Israeli prisoners of war to extract major concessions from Israel. They know that the Israelis are worried about their prisoners of war and this could be exploited to advantage.

12. Syria formally demands complete evacuation of Israeli forces. As *quid pro quo*, it is surmised that it might be persuaded to accept some sort of demilitarisation or stationing of U.N. forces on the Israeli occupied Golan heights after the Israelis withdrawal, instead of occupying the heights itself. On the question of Israel's recognition, provided Egypt and Saudi Arabia do so, Syria might follow suit.

13. On the question of Palestinian national rights Syria insists that these must be guaranteed. It would not accept any settlement which is not acceptable to the PLO.

14. On Jerusalem, Syria's view is that this question is covered by its position on withdrawal of Israeli troops from all their occupied territories. It also supports King Faisal's stand at Algiers, about preserving the Arab character of Jerusalem.

C. Jordan

15. The Jordanian attitude towards the Geneva Conference may be summarised as follows :

- (a) It places primary importance on Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank and all Arab lands occupied since 5th June, 1967. Jordan would not accept any partial solution or a solution with one party but only an overall solution with the Arab States directly concerned. This requires Arab States to ensure among themselves "unity of obligation, unity of refusal and unity of acceptance." Jordan has taken the line that since the pre-1967 lines between the West Bank and Israel were cease-fire lines and not international boundaries, minor rectifications on a reciprocal basis are possible.
- (b) Jordan bases its stand on Resolution 242, and interprets the provision regarding Israeli withdrawal to imply that the territories should go back to their former sovereign/occupants.
- (c) After Israeli withdrawal has taken place, there will be a plebiscite under international supervision enabling the Palestinians to exercise their right of self-determination to decide whether they want to stay with Jordan or form a separate State. The plebiscite would include all Palestinians "wherever they are" including those in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, the West Bank, the East Bank and Gaza.
- (d) Until a plebiscite is held neither Jordan nor any other party can speak in the name of the Palestinians. Thus Jordan does not accept the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. In this

stance Jordan stood completely isolated at the Arab Summit, having been forsaken even by its staunch supporters, Saudi Arabia and Morocco.

16. King Hussain has a strong emotional attachment to Jerusalem and to the custody of its Holy Places. Jordan insists that Arab Jerusalem must be given up by Israel in favour of Jordanian sovereignty.

D. Lebanon

17. The Lebanese consider Resolution 242, read in conjunction with Resolution 338, as a satisfactory basis for a permanent settlement in the present conditions.

18. At this stage, Lebanon is not actively involved in the Geneva Peace negotiations because it was assured by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Sisco during his visit in November, 1973, that its interests at the Geneva Peace Conference would be safeguarded by America. At a later stage, however, Lebanon would like to see its borders with Israel finalized. Nonetheless, as Lebanon is a frontline State, it is worthwhile examining its attitude to the issues which are before the Geneva Peace Conference.

19. Lebanon's espouses a just solution of "the national rights of the Palestinian people", because it feels that unless a Palestinian State is created it would continue to be subjected to Israeli raids on Southern Lebanon owing to the location of a number of Palestinian Commando Camps there. Lebanon, in accepting the French version of Resolution 242, maintains that Israel has to withdraw from all occupied territories. It holds that it approves Security Council Resolution 242 but the question of *accepting* it does not arise since Lebanon was not a party to the 1967 war.

20. Lebanon formally holds that Israel must vacate Jerusalem and that Jerusalem must be returned to Arab hands. However given the ethnic composition of its population and the preponderance of Christians in positions of power, Lebanon may agree to the internationalization of Jerusalem. This assessment is given credence

by a recent statement of the former Lebanese Prime Minister, Saeb Salam, delivered in the Lebanese Parliament recently, to the effect that during Mr. Sisco's recent visit, Lebanon had promised to propagate internationalization of Jerusalem.

V. ATTITUDES OF OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES

21. The attitudes of the Arab countries other than the front-line nations have been analysed in the Section dealing with an exposition of the Arab stand at the Arab Summit at Algiers where the Arabs were able to formulate a united position on the major Middle East problems. Here we may mention that Libya and Iraq have been extreme in their denunciation of the Geneva Peace Conference. They regard it as a sell out on the part of the Arabs and consider that it would not yield any positive results. However this is a minority opinion not shared by the other Arab States who feel that under conditions obtaining after October 1973, the Geneva Peace Conference offers a reasonable chance of attaining their minimum objectives.

VI. ATTITUDE OF THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION

22. A proper appreciation of the attitude of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation to the Geneva talks requires some acquaintance with the historic injustices perpetrated upon them by the Jews. Although their fore-fathers lived in Palestine for the last 1300 years, it is ironical that today they are scattered in many Arab lands, having been expelled twice from their homes—in 1947, when the United Nations partitioned Palestine, awarding the Jews 48 per cent of the land when the Jews owned only six per cent; and after the 1967 war, following Israeli occupation of the whole of the West Bank of the Jordan River, including Jerusalem and the Gaza strip. Israel launched a ruthless programme of uprooting and expelling the Arab population and transplanting in its place Jewish immigrants from all over the world. Rendered aliens in their own homes by the fiat of a settler state, denied justice and not knowing peace, the Palestinian diaspora has been much worse than that experienced by any Jew.

23. The roots of the fedayeen organisations lie embedded deep in the Palestinian psyche. Although the PLO consists of five major groups, the Al Fatah, lead by Yasser Arafat, is the largest and most prominent. With the acknowledgement, by the Arab Summit at Algiers, of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians and the right of Yasser Arafat to act as its spokesman, a separate Palestinian state embracing the West Bank and Gaza is now becoming a possibility.

The Soviet Union has assured Yasser Arafat of its support in this matter ; Israel and Jordan are opposed, while the U.S. discreetly supports the Jordanian position on this question. Nonetheless, Kissinger, during his recent visit to Algeria, is reported to have discussed with Boumeddiene the outlines of his plan of a Palestinian State covering the West Bank of the River Jordan and linked with Gaza through a corridor.

24. The PLO are presently on the horns of a dilemma. If they continue with their insistence on the dissolution of Israel and its replacement by a multi-racial and multi-religious state embracing the whole of Palestine, they can expect little sympathy from the front line Arab States. Therefore, there is an emerging awareness that in order to survive as a significant factor in Middle East politics, they have to come to terms with the existence of Israel. The PLO have been concerned with evolving a formula which, while enabling them to participate in the Geneva Conference would at the same time not vitiate their formal commitment for the liberation of occupied Palestine. The acceptance by the PLO of a truncated Palestinian state is thus a change of attitude, on their part, towards Israel.

25. The situation therefore remains amorphous. In any case the acknowledgement of the representative character of the PLO carries the implication that the West Bank of the River Jordan and Jerusalem are no longer the exclusive concern of Jordan. Yasser Arafat has recently suggested if King Hussain agreed.....
..... to step down from his throne, the PLO

and the West Bank Palestinians may consider the idea of forming a joint Palestine—Jordan state comprising both banks of the River Jordan and negotiating a treaty with Israel.

VII. ATTITUDE OF ISRAEL

26. Israel has been taken aback by the increased military muscle displayed by the Arabs in October 1973 and by their ability to handle modern sophisticated weapons with competence. Although Israel had the upper hand in the war, its ability to quickly force a military decision has vanished. Perhaps Israel now realises that, tactically at least, a negotiated agreement on the questions of withdrawals, the rights of the Palestinians and the future of Jerusalem, are in its interest. In recent months, the Arabs have been able to obtain the support of most of the African States for their stand. The oil diplomacy has forced many Western European nations to give public expressions of support for the Arab stand. Israel realises that the all the territorial spoils of war gained through military prowess, cannot be kept indefinitely. Moreover, its main bastion of support and supplier of arms and economic aid, the United States, may be reluctant to give it the same degree of support as in the past. Israel may therefore be pressured by the United States into withdrawing from much of Arab territories provided its security and right to existence are guaranteed formally by the United States.

26A. Although Israel has not taken an official position concerning its territorial claims, the ideas of the ruling Labour Party are well known. They are :

- (1) *Sinai*.—Israel must hold Sharm el Sheikh and the access road to it from Eilat, preferably by means of a line drawn from the El Arish area. Agreement for the use of oil from Western Sinai would also be sought.
- (2) *Gaza*.—To remain under Israeli control, with further Jewish settlements developed as a security buffer against Egypt. There have been indications that Israel might consider proposals for a link between Gaza and the West Bank if this involves no danger to its security.

- (3) *Golan Heights*.—The earlier position of Israel was that it would hold as much of the Heights as is needed to prevent attacks on its settlements in the valleys, but will negotiate the return of the major part and its demilitarisation. However Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir has recently stated that Israel will not give Syria the Golan Heights as part of any Middle East Peace agreement and regards its settlements in the region as an integral part of the Jewish State.
- (4) *West Bank*.—Israel wants to keep settlements and troops along the Jordan River and on the hill ridges near Nablus and Hebron, including the area of Kiryat Arab, the Jewish estate near Hebron. The heavily-populated Arab towns of the West Bank will be allowed to become an Arab State which can be no more than an Israeli satellite.
- (5) *Jerusalem*.—Must remain united as Israel's capital, but Muslims and Christians may administer their own holy places.

A map (attached as Annexure III) appearing in the Christian Science Monitor of November 28, 1973, illustrates the withdrawal options being considered by Israel on the Egyptian front.

27. Israel is expected to be unyielding on Jerusalem and Palestinian rights. The extent of the compromises would depend upon the ability of the United States to exert pressure on Israel. Faced with the option of being seriously threatened by a combined Arab onslaught without the assurance of US backing, it is possible that the Israeli position on Jerusalem and on the creation of a Palestinian State may become flexible enough to be acceptable to the Arabs. At the present stage these questions remain largely conjectural. The United States has declared that the future of Jerusalem should be discussed last, as this problem was the most intractable.

VIII. ACHIEVEMENT OF THE CONFERENCE TODATE

28. Egypt, Jordan and Israel participated in the Geneva Conference in response to an invitation received from the Secretary General of the United Nations. The invitation itself was based on a message received by him from the Soviet and American governments calling for the convening of the Conference. The text of the Soviet and American messages is attached as Annexure IV.

29. The first session was essentially a procedural one. The first item of discussion was the question of disengagement of Israeli and Egyptian forces subsequent to the ceasefire of October 22, 1973. The Egyptian stand was that the U.S. would have to prove her *bona fides* during the disengagement talks by persuading Israel to make concessions. In return, Egypt would persuade Syria and the PLO to join the talks. Without the latter's participation, an overall settlement in the Middle East could not be achieved.

30. So far, the only concrete outcome has been the setting up of a military working group to resolve the question of disengagement of forces. It was decided that the Conference would resume at the Ambassadorial level when appropriate and later at the Foreign Minister's level in the light of further developments. However, so far, no further meeting has taken place. The military talks, deadlocked at first, came to a successful conclusion on January 18, 1974 mainly due to the efforts made by Kissinger. The two basic points of the agreement are :

- (1) Disengagement of forces on the Suez front to be the first step of a final settlement, and
- (2) withdrawal of Israeli troops to the new lines to be completed within 40 days.

31. The following provisions about the principles governing the separation of the two forces have been announced :

- (1) All Egyptian forces on the east side of the Canal will be deployed west of a line designated as line 'A' on an attached map. Israeli forces, including those west of

the Suez Canal and the Bitter Lakes, will be deployed east of a line designated as line 'B' on a map attached to the agreement. (running close to the Sinai Mountains).

- (2) The area between the Egyptian and Israeli lines will be a zone of disengagements where the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) will be stationed.
- (3) The area between the Egyptian line and the Suez Canal will be limited in armament and forces.
- (4) The area between the Israeli line and another line running along the western base of the Mountain will be limited in armament and forces. These limitations would be inspected by UNEF.
- (5) The two sides air forces will be permitted to operate within their respective lines without interference from the other side.
- (6) The detailed implementation of the disengagement of forces will be worked out by military representatives of Egypt and Israel, who will agree on the stages of this process.

32. It is generally believed that along with the publicly announced details of the disengagement agreement, Egypt and Israel signed a document containing secret clauses regulating technical details of the withdrawal. The same clauses are apparently designed to disguise the extent of concessions made by both sides and to ensure linkage between disengagement and further progress towards an overall settlement. The process of implementation of the disengagement agreement commenced on January 25, 1974. A phased withdrawal is envisaged. The third phase of disengagement began on February 6, 1974 and is expected to be completed in 20 days. So far, the disengagement of forces has proceeded without any hitch.

IX. CONCLUSION

33. The Geneva Peace Conference is a promising beginning. If the Arabs can maintain a united stand on the issues that concern the Conference, if they do not allow the United States and Israel to divide them on these issues, if they are not lured into concluding separate agreements with Israel, there is a reasonable prospect that the Geneva Conference might produce some positive results. However, given the history of the Middle East, the traditional antagonisms among the main countries and leaders, the extremely complex and complicated nature of the disputes, it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that the Geneva Conference faces an uphill task. The issues to be resolved are so emotive, the divergence of the parties to the conflict so great, that it would require a supreme political effort to bridge the present chasm that separates them. If past history is any guide there is a likelihood of the Geneva Conference being bogged down in stalemate. If this happens the chances of renewed fighting in the Middle East cannot be ruled out.

X. RECOMMENDATIONS

34. The major issues which affect the Geneva Peace Conference are :

- (1) The question of Syrian participation.
- (2) The question of Palestinian Liberation Organisations' participation.
- (3) The question of the status of Jerusalem.

35. First and foremost we should commend the Arabs for the unity they have shown both during and after the war. It should be stressed that the maintenance of a united front against Israel is a categorical imperative if the Arabs hope to succeed in the arduous negotiations that lie ahead. We are not directly concerned with the intra Arab contradictions. Although we should not get directly involved in Arab differences, we should express the hope that the Arabs would, in the interests of overall unity, be able to reconcile their differences.

36. Syrian participation in the Geneva Peace Conference is essential for its success. If the question of Syrian participation comes up for discussion at the Islamic Summit, we should support efforts which would facilitate Syrian participation.

37. The question of the participation of PLO at the Geneva Peace Conference had previously represented a thorny problem. However, a statement by King Hussain issued in Amman on February 11, 1974 indicates that Jordan has softened its stand on the issue of the PLO's right to represent Palestinians. King Hussain Said, "We do not claim to represent all the sons of Palestine. Therefore, we do not object that a Palestinian delegation would represent the other aspects of the Palestinians rights at the Geneva Conference."

38. The Palestinian issue will come to the fore at the Lahore Summit. It might well turn out to be the most sensitive and divisive issue. Jordan is deeply hurt over the Head of State treatment given to Yasser Arafat and the decision taken with regard to the status of PLO at the Arab Summit at Algiers. Our position as hosts would thus be a delicate one. While we are committed to according Yasser Arafat the same honours as due to a Head of State, this may be done in low key, as directed by the Prime Minister who was pleased to observe: "Low key for Arafat but not so low as to be noticeable. He has been a leader of a great cause upheld bravely." Otherwise, we would be regarded as having already decided the issue against Jordan even before it had been discussed at the Summit. We should reiterate to the Jordanians that we continue to value their friendship and recognise that they have been good friends of Pakistan.

39. On the question of the status of Jerusalem. The Arabs decided at Algiers that :

"the present ceasefire is not peace which can only be achieved by the realisation of two essential conditions, namely, evacuation by Israel of all the occupied Arab territories, in the first place Jerusalem, and restoration

of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. As long as these conditions are not met the situation would remain explosive and lead to fresh confrontation."

We should endorse this position whole heartedly. The Pakistan delegation should seek a decision or proclamation which strongly supports the general Arab position. Jerusalem is also one issue on which Pakistan can safely take an initiative at the Summit, without the danger of offending any of the Islamic Countries, despite their differing views about the City's future. It is therefore recommended that Pakistan should propose a specific resolution on Jerusalem which would be based on the decisions of the previous Islamic Conferences and the Arab Summit in Algiers. A draft resolution to this effect is at Appendix IV.

POSSIBLE AREAS OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Article II of the charter of the Islamic Conference states that one of the objectives of the conference would be "the consolidation of cooperation amongst member States in the economic, social, cultural, scientific and other vital fields of activities and to carry out consultation among member States in international organizations."

2. Muslim countries participating in the Islamic Summit represent about 11% of the world population. Most of them are developing countries and do not have an industrial base. Their economies are primarily agricultural. A majority of them are not self-sufficient in food production. At present there is not much trade amongst them. The trade amongst the 30 countries members of the Islamic Conference is less than 5% of their total foreign trade.

3. The Islamic world needs to turn itself into a self-sufficient unit as far as possible so that the economies of its members become complementary and not competitive. The countries of the Islamic world have to bend their efforts towards reducing their dependence on the developed market economy countries of the Western world. The recognition is growing that the economic conflict of interests which separates the Islamic world from the Western countries is but a reflection of the effort at cultural domination by the West over Islam.

4. There are countries in the Islamic world which are rich but do not have sufficient manpower, infra-structure or technical skills. There are others which are poor but are more advanced in the field of technology and in infra-structure besides having much greater manpower. These countries could to a great extent meet and fulfil the needs and requirements of one another. Such an

orchestration of effort would result in close economic collaboration among the countries of the Islamic World, and would result in the development of their economies in such a manner as to ensure self-sustaining growth.

5. Unity of purpose and action would also enable these countries to negotiate with the developed countries from a position of strength on the whole range of economic issues. The Islamic World must ensure that its members are not exploited in the future as they have been in the past by the developed market economy countries through procurement of cheap oil and other commodities on the one hand and the rapid increases in the prices of the manufactured goods on the other while the prices of the commodities and other primary products were not allowed to rise comparably.

6. The following ideas for collaboration in the industrial and agriculture sectors can be explored further :—

(a) *The Industrial Sector*

It is evident that the developing countries must have a solid industrial base if they wish to attain even minimal levels of self-sustained growth. Setting up of joint ventures or investment in the existing ones could be considered as a first step. The following areas for setting up industries could be explored :—

- (1) Petro-Chemicals and Fertilizer.
- (2) Cement and building materials.
- (3) Basic and Heavy Chemicals.
- (4) Cotton Textiles.
- (5) Consumer goods.
- (6) Transportation and Communication (mercantile fleets).
- (7) Agro-Industries.
- (8) Electronics.
- (9) Food processing.

The oil producing countries could invest their surplus revenues into those developing countries which have the potential as well as the

know-how required for setting up such industries, for long term mutual benefit.

7. As a result of their increased economic strength and bargaining power the oil producing countries will be in a position to obtain advanced technology from developed countries in return for oil. They are setting up huge industrial complexes in their own countries. It would be in the larger interest of oil producers that in manning these industrial complexes, technical personnel from other Islamic countries are also recruited to the extent considered desirable, since such personnel would be able to render more loyal and dedicated service. Moreover the oil producers would require markets for their products as a result of their industrialisation process. Such markets would be available to them in Islamic countries which have huge populations and whose economies are still primarily agriculture oriented.

8. It should also be established that as a matter of principle those items which can be supplied at competitive prices by the Muslim countries should invariably be purchased from them by other countries of the Islamic World.

(b) The Agriculture Sector

In the field of agriculture, provided the necessary inputs and investment are available, the Muslim countries of the world could easily become self-sufficient in food and would no more be subjected to threats like the one uttered by the Vice-President of the United States, Mr. Gerald Ford, who said that if the Arabs refuse to lift the oil embargo on the United States, the United States should refuse to export foodgrains to these countries.

The food produced in the developing Islamic countries would also be much more competitive in prices than those obtained from the commodity exporting developed countries, because of cheaper labour, proximity of markets and consequent lesser freight charges. An increase in food production would also enable the developing

countries to bring down the prices of food thus effectively breaking the monopolistic exporting situation existing in the cereal market, especially in wheat.

The Islamic countries must realise that their future prosperity depends on close cooperation based on mutuality of interests, interdependence and complementarity of their economies. Fortunately the Islamic World is today in a much better position than ever before to turn these ideas of economic cooperation into reality.

Action recommended

If these ideas receive favourable reaction from the countries members of the Islamic Conference, the Summit could decide to request the economic committee of the annual conference of Foreign Ministers to call for the necessary studies. Countries members of the Conference could also hold talks with a view to arriving at bilateral agreements.

This paper might also be circulated as an informal working paper to all participating delegations.

POSITION PAPER

ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK

The idea of forming a development bank to serve the needs of developing countries in the Islamic World dates back to December, 1970. Pakistan was one of the co-sponsors of the idea.

2. The proposal envisages the setting up a multinational development institution on the lines of the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. The proposed Bank would be an additional source of development funds for accelerating economic growth in Islamic countries which are members of the Islamic Conference. It would mobilise the required funds from within and outside the region. Furthermore, it would assist in creating conditions conducive to the stepping up of domestic savings and investments. The working capital of the Bank will stand at \$ one Billion.

3. The Islamic Development Bank is to be independent of the Islamic Conference and its Secretariat. A conference of the Finance Ministers of the Islamic Conference was held in December 1973 in Jeddah to finalise the 'declaration of intent' for the establishment of the Bank and to set up a preparatory committee to prepare its charter and outline of organization.

4. The declaration of intent was signed by all participating countries (Twenty-three). A Preparatory Committee of 16 member countries has been set up under the chairmanship of Tunku Abdul Rahman. Pakistan was elected the Secretary of the Preparatory Committee. The declaration of intent defines the proposed institution in broad outline. Its exact role, capital structure and organization, management and operational policies and allied aspects have to be worked out by the Preparatory Committee. Some work has been done on these aspects by Egypt and Malaysia but neither study is entirely satisfactory.

5. The position taken by Pakistan, in brief, at the Islamic Conference, was based on the following principal points and considerations :

- (i) The Establishment of an Islamic Development Bank would be a major demonstration of the spirit of solidarity among the Islamic countries.
- (ii) The need and importance of evolving a financial and economic system in consonance with Islamic principles and ideals which would meet the demands of modern society. This required a blending of the considerations of sound finance and the larger objective of a harmonious development throughout the Muslim world.
- (iii) The need and importance of developing the economies of the Muslim countries in such a manner as would strengthen each other and the international Islamic community as a whole.

The rich Arab countries have already organized at least 3 institutions to assist the poor countries amongst them, namely, (a) Kuwait Fund for *Arab* Economic Development, (b) *Arab-African* Development Bank, and (c) *Arab Fund* for Social and Economic Development (at Kuwait), apart from substantial inter-Arab bilateral assistance which is determined from time to time. The Islamic Development Bank would, however, service a wider area in respect of both eligibility and purpose.

5. The discussions which preceded the approval of declaration of intent revealed that not all the participating countries had the same ideas about the proposed Bank. Many delegations wanted to fashion it after their own concept and philosophy and to suit their own situation and needs. Egypt, in particular, wanted the Bank to be based on what was termed as the 'Egyptian Study'.

Policy Recommendations :

The Islamic Development Bank has not been included as a separate item on the Agenda of the Summit. However, in the general context of economic cooperation it is possible that the

matter may be raised by some delegations. If the Summit expresses a desire to include a reference to the Islamic Development Bank in the Lahore Declaration we may support the idea. A possible formulation of the reference in the Declaration can be along the following lines :—

“The Summit expressed satisfaction with the progress already made towards the establishment of the Islamic Development Bank and expressed the hope that its structure, organisation, functions and policies will be elaborated by the Preparatory Committee set up for this purpose within the established time schedule.”

POSITION PAPER

COOPERATION IN THE SCIENTIFIC FIELD

ISLAMIC SCIENCE FOUNDATION

Consideration should be given to the setting up of an Islamic Science Foundation to build up high level scientific personnel and scientific institutions in Muslim countries. If the idea of creating such a foundation is accepted in principle, it could then be established along the following lines :

Foundation

The foundation would be created by Islamic countries, with the objective of promotion of science and technology at an advanced level. The Foundation (working in conjunction with the Islamic Conference) would be sponsored by the Muslim countries, and operate within these, with an endowment fund of \$ 1,000 million and a projected annual income of around \$ 60—\$ 70 million. The Foundation would be non-political, purely scientific, and run by eminent men of science and technology from the Muslim world.

Need

No Muslim country possesses high level scientific and technological competence. The major reason is the persistent neglect by Governments and society in recent times in acquiring such competence. In relation to international norms (around 0.3% of economically active manpower engaged in higher scientific, medical and technological pursuits, with around 1% of GNP spent on these), the norms reached in the Islamic world are one tenth of what one should expect for a modern society.

Objectives of the Foundation

The Islamic Science Foundation would have the twin objectives of *creating high level scientific expertise and scientific institutions*. In pursuit of these objectives ;

- (a) The foundation would create new communities of scientists in disciplines where none exist. It would

strengthen those communities which do exist. This would be done in a systematic manner, with the urgency of a crash programme.

- (b) The Foundation would help in building up and in strengthening *institutions* for advanced scientific research at international level, both in pure and applied fields, relevant to the needs of the Muslim countries and their development.

The emphasis of the Foundation's work would lie in building up science to *international standards of quality and attainment*. Of the two objectives listed above, the creation of high level scientific expertise would receive higher priority in the first stages of the Foundation's work.

Programme

In pursuance of its twin objectives (a) of building up high-level scientific manpower in a systematic manner, and (b) of employing this manpower for advanced work for the betterment and strength of Islamic societies, the Foundation would pursue the following programme :—

- (a) *Building up of Scientific Communities.*—(i) Scholars would be sponsored by the Foundation to acquire knowledge of advanced sciences, wherever available, in areas where gaps exist and where there are no existing leaders of sciences. After their return to their countries, the Foundation would help them to continue with their work. Funds of the order of \$ 10 million would support some 4,000 scholars annually while they are receiving advanced training, and support around 1,000 scholars and the needed facilities on their return.
- (ii) Programmes would be organised around existing scientific institutions in order to increase high level scientific manpower. For this purpose contracts would be awarded to University departments to strengthen their



work in selected fields. *Quality* of the University faculties would be the criterion for the award of these contracts. Funds to the total of around \$ 15 million may be spent annually for these contracts.

- (iii) *Contact of scholars from the Islamic World with the world scientific community.*—Existing science in Muslim countries is weak because of its isolation. There are no contacts between scholars in Muslim countries and the world scientific community, principally on account of distance. Science thrives on the interchange of ideas and on continuous criticism. In countries with no international scientific contacts, science ossifies and dies. The Foundation would endeavour to change this. This would entail frequent two-way visits of fellows and scholars, and holding of international symposia and conferences. Funds of the order of around \$ 5 million would subsidise some 3,000 visits a year of around two months duration. This, spread over around 10 sciences and over 15 countries, is about 20 visits a year from any one country in any one science.
- (b) *Sponsoring of Relevant Applied Research.*—The Foundation may spend around \$ 25 million for the strengthening of existing, and the creation of new research institutions on problems of development in the Middle East and the Islamic world. These new institutes of international level and standing would be devoted to research in problems of health, technology (including petroleum technology), agricultural techniques and water resources. These institutions may also become units of the United Nations University System in order to attain international standards of quality and achievement through contact with the international community. (A successful institute like the International Rice Institute in the Philippines costs about \$ 5—\$ 6 million to create and about the same amount to run at an *international level*).

- (c) The Foundation may spend around \$ 5 million in making the general population of Islamic countries technologically and scientifically minded. This will be achieved through instructions using mass media, through scientific museums, libraries and exhibitions, and through the award of prizes for discoveries and inventions. An appreciation of science and technology by the masses is crucial if there is to be a real impact of science and technology.
- (d) The Foundation would help with the task of modernizing syllabi for science and technology at the High School as well as University levels.

Functioning of the Foundation

(a) The Foundation would be open to sponsorship by all Islamic countries which are members of the Islamic Conference.

(b) The Foundation would have its headquarters at the seat of the Islamic Conference. In order to retain active and continuous contact with the research centres and projects it endows, it may set up subsidiary offices as well as employ scientific representatives, resident or at large.

(c) The Board of Trustees of the Foundation, which would be responsible for liaison with the Governments, would consist of representatives of the Governments, preferably scientists. The endowment fund of the Foundation would be vested in the name of the Board of Trustees.

(d) There would be an Executive Council of the Foundation which would consist of scientists of eminence from the Muslim countries. The first Council and its Chairman who would also be the Chief Executive of the Foundation would be appointed by the Board of Trustees for a five year term. This Council would decide on the Foundation's scientific policies, the expenditure of the funds, their disbursement and their administration. The work of the Foundation and the Executive Council would be of a non-political

nature. The Board of Trustees, through the statutes, will be charged with the responsibility of ensuring this.

(e) The Foundation would have the legal status of a registered non-profit body.

(f) The Foundation would have links with the United Nations, UNESCO and the United Nations University System.

Financing of the Foundation

(a) It is envisaged that the endowment fund of the Foundation would be \$ 1,000 million.

(b) The contribution of each sponsoring country would be decided according to an equitable formula to be worked out at the appropriate time.

Policy

While it would not be possible to include this proposal or any other similar proposal in the formal agenda of the Summit it might be useful to throw up the idea at the Preparatory Meeting of Senior Officials in the context of general cooperation between Islamic countries. If there is general interest in the idea, the next Conference of Foreign Ministers can be directed to consider its modalities.

POSITION PAPER

THE QUESTION OF FILIPINO MUSLIMS

1. The Muslims constitute 10% of the total Filipino population which is estimated at 40 million. Educationally backward and economically impoverished, they inhabit the Southern parts of the Philippines. In Mindanao and Sulu islands (where the Muslim revolt is now centred) they are in a majority which, however, has been partly eroded by the influx and resettlement of Christians from the northern areas.

2. In mid-1971 the Filipino Muslims complained that their lands were being taken away by the Government and given to Christians. The then Secretary General of the Islamic Secretariat, Tunku Abdur Rahman, sent a telegram to the Philippines Foreign Minister inquiring about the matter. The Philippines Foreign Minister assured the Secretary-General that it was not a communal problem but one of ownership of land.

3. In November, 1971, the Islamic Secretariat circulated a note to all members of the Islamic Conference giving a brief account of the problems of the Muslims in the Philippines and identifying the causes of their trouble. These were :

- (a) Muslims had been dispossessed of their land holdings by the Christians. The latter had acquired title to Muslim holdings.
- (b) Religious animosity on the part of Catholics against the Muslims.
- (c) Attempts by missionaries to convert Muslims to Christianity.
- (d) Anti-Muslim activities by the Christian priests who smuggled arms for eventual use against the Muslims.
- (e) Tribal feuds.

(f) Advent of the Christian bandit leader, Feliciano Luces, who massacred Muslim women and children in Upi Municipality in March, 1970.

(g) Atrocities by the Philippine troops.

4. In January, 1972, the Philippines Government invited a group of Muslim diplomats in Manila to visit Muslim areas in the Philippines to study the problem. It was a conducted tour. However, the touring Muslim Envoys felt that although the evidence produced before them was not sufficient to come to any categorical conclusion regarding the genocide charge, it was a fact that the Filipino Muslims felt very insecure and mistrustful of the Armed Forces and that their grievances were real. The Egyptian Ambassador, who was one of the Envoys visiting the troubled area, made a public pronouncement to the effect that the root of the trouble was mainly socio-economic, complicated by political factors. He further stated that the Philippines Government had ameliorated the lot of the Muslim minority but much more had yet to be done.

5. The Third Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held in Jeddah in February, 1972 considered the question of the Filipino Muslims. While expressing serious concern over the plight of Muslims living in the Philippines, the Conference decided to seek the good offices of the Government of Philippines to guarantee their safety and their property. The Conference requested the Secretary-General to contact the Philippines Government in this regard and submit to the member States a report on the result of his contacts.

6. A two nation delegation (Libyan and Egyptian) headed by Ali Treki of Libya visited the Philippines in July 1972 on a fact finding mission. On his return Ali Treki submitted a report to his Government which prompted the Libyan Head of State, Colonel Qaddafi, to suggest to the Islamic Secretariat to convene an extraordinary meeting of the Islamic Foreign Ministers to consider the question of the Filipino Muslims.

7. The Islamic Secretariat also circulated a note to all the member States of the Islamic Conference in November 1972 reporting the repression of Filipino Muslims.

8. As a result of the consensus reached between the member States it was decided that instead of calling an extraordinary meeting of the Islamic Foreign Ministers to exclusively consider the question of Filipino Muslims it should be included in the agenda of the Fourth Islamic Conference to be held in Benghazi in 1973. That Conference expressed its deep concern over the reported repression and mass extermination of Muslims in South Philippines and urged the Philippines Government to halt these operations immediately. It appealed to all peace loving States, religious and international organisations to use their good offices with the Philippines Government to halt the campaign of violence against the Muslim community and ensure their safety and the basic liberties as proclaimed by the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and by the Philippines Constitution. The Conference also decided to send a delegation composed of the Foreign Ministers of Libya, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and Somalia to discuss with the Philippines Government the condition of its Muslim minority. It was decided that the mission should be undertaken within three months and member States be informed of the result achieved. The Conference also decided that diplomatic efforts should be exerted with international religious institutions and authorities and that such efforts should be coordinated by the Secretary-General.

Pakistan's Position

9. In Pakistan public opinion had been incensed by the continued reports of government excesses against the Muslims. The President (now Prime Minister) made a public statement on 27th March, 1973 expressing our grave concern and anguish at the deteriorating condition of the Muslims. The statement was as follows :

“The people of Pakistan have been following with grave concern and anguish the alarming situation that now prevails in the southern Philippines resulting from a

renewed escalation of repressive measures against the Muslim population. We are appalled at this recrudescence of violence which has already claimed several hundred Muslim lives and brought untold miseries and sufferings to the Muslims of the area. It is deplorable that these tragic events are taking place despite the assurances given by the Philippine leaders to rectify through peaceful means the acknowledged inequalities and injustices suffered by the Muslims for a long time.

“Relations between Pakistan and the Philippines, two fellow members of the Asian Community, have been traditionally friendly and cordial. In expressing our concern over the condition of the Muslims in the Philippines, therefore, we are motivated by a sincere desire to encourage a peaceful and durable settlement of the underlying causes of Muslim dissatisfaction. The Government and the people of Pakistan sincerely hope that the Government of the Philippines will respond to this humanitarian appeal and will take immediate steps to safeguard the lives and properties of the Muslim population and initiate measures that will assure them of their just rights”.

10. The Islamic Secretariat informed the member States in November, 1973, that the 4-man Delegation appointed by the Benghazi Islamic Conference visited the Philippines in August, 1973. The Delegation was able to visit various places in the Southern islands and to see evacuation camps and to interview the evacuees. President Marcos was reported to have openly admitted that there had been neglect on the part of the Government to attend to the welfare of Filipino Muslims and that he had taken measures to correct this by giving more attention to them in the socio-economic field. The Delegation felt that President Marcos was really anxious and willing to solve the problems of the Filipino Muslims.

11. The Delegation submitted a lengthy report which was circulated to all member States. The Delegation also recommended

that the Islamic Conference should extend a helping hand to the Muslims in the Philippines and to ensure that the assistance offered did not go to the wrong quarters as had been the case hitherto.

12. In a recent letter to the Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, the Secretary General of the Islamic Conference has indicated the willingness of President Marcos to receive a 4-man delegation from Muslim States in Manila to discuss the establishment of a welfare and relief agency for the Filipino Muslims. The Secretary General recommends that the forthcoming Islamic Summit should consider a draft resolution to establish not only a welfare agency for the Filipino Muslims but also other agencies for muslims all over the world, who may find themselves living under conditions similar to those prevailing in the Philippines. He specifically mentions the case of muslims living in the South of Thailand. The Secretary General envisages that after the adoption of the resolution by the Islamic Summit a "relevant department" would have to be created in the Islamic Secretariat.

13. The then Secretary-General, Tunku Abdur Rahman, also met Pope Paul VI on 6 October 1973, and requested him to take cognizance of the matter which had posed such serious human problems and to take whatever steps he considered necessary or proper in the cause of human dignity, peace and justice. The Pope assured the Tunku that he would do all that he could but advised that the Muslim leaders all over the world should also do the same.

Pakistan Delegation's approach in the Fourth Islamic Conference towards the Question of the Filipino Muslims.

14. On the question of the Filipino Muslims the Pakistan Delegation was instructed to take a back seat and to adhere to the following guide lines :—

- (a) The Muslim problem in the Philippines is an internal affair of the Philippines.
- (b) With our present difficulties we cannot afford to get involved in such issues.

- (c) We should avoid taking any action that would appear to be an interference in the Philippines' internal affairs.
- (d) We should avoid getting involved in any clandestine operation either by Libya or any other country to help the Philippines Muslims.
- (e) The Islamic Secretariat is the best forum for taking up this question.
- (f) We may agree to a joint demarche from the Muslim countries to the Government of the Philippines on this question.

15. Our Delegation was also instructed that if the Conference adopted a resolution expressing its concern at the fate of the Filipino Muslims, it should not oppose it. However, if it was decided to send a Delegation to Manila, we may decline to participate in it on the plea of our pre-occupation with the problems in South Asia. The Delegation was instructed to support the move to charge the Islamic Secretariat totally with this problem on behalf of the Muslim countries.

Policy Recommendations

16. It is possible that Libya may raise the matter again at the Lahore Summit. We should continue to maintain a low profile on this issue.

17. It is possible that the Libyan pronouncement on the Filipino Muslims may be picked up and echoed in two or three other statements. In such a case it is recommended that we try to ensure that the matter does not receive too much prominence. The Summit could take note of these statements and refer it to the next Foreign Ministers Annual Conference.

18. Should Libya try to get a resolution passed on the subject or wish to give the matter prominence in the Joint Communique/Declaration, we should not take the lead in trying to dissuade

Libya from such a course but work in concert with other delegations to evolve a consensus, pointing out that the main preoccupation of the present Summit is the situation in the Middle East and the question of Jerusalem. The Islamic Secretariat, being already seized of the matter, could report to the next Conference of Foreign Ministers. It would be embarrassing for us if there was a reference to the plight of the Filipino Muslims and no word about that of the Indian Muslims or the Muslims of Kashmir.

19. The Secretary General is most likely to raise the question of the establishment of a Welfare Agency for the Filipino Muslims at the Preparatory Meeting of the Senior Officials and the Conference of the Foreign Ministers. If there is general consensus we may go along with the idea particularly so when President Marcos of the Philippines has himself indicated his "deep interest" in setting up such an agency.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 (1967)

ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 1382ND MEETING,
ON 22 NOVEMBER 1967

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasising the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. *Affirms* that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires as the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles :

- (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict ;
- (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force ;

(2) *Affirms further* the necessity

- (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area ;
- (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem ;
- (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones ;

(3) *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution.


(4) *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.


SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338 (1973)

ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 1747TH MEETING,
ON 21/22 OCTOBER 1973

The Security Council,

1. *Calls upon* all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy ;
 2. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts ;
 3. *Decides* that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.
-





SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION No. 237 (1967) OF 14 JUNE 1967**CALLING ON ISRAEL TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS IN AREAS AFFECTED BY THE 1967 MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT****The Security Council,**

Considering the urgent need to spare the civil populations and the prisoners of the war in the area of conflict in the Middle East additional sufferings,

Considering that essential and inalienable human rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes of war,

Considering that all the obligations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949 should be complied with by the parties involved in the conflict,

1. *Calls upon* the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities ;

2. *Recommends* to the Governments concerned the scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles governing the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilian persons in time of war, contained in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow the effective implementation of this resolution and to report to the Security Council.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION No. 2253 (ES-V) OF 4 JULY 1967
CALLING UPON ISRAEL TO RESCIND AND DESIST FROM MEASURES
TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned at the situation prevailing in Jerusalem as a result of the measures taken by Israel to change the status of the City,

1. *Considers* that these measures are invalid ;
2. *Calls upon* Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem ;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly and the Security Council on the situation and on the implementation of the present resolution not later than one week from its adoption.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION No. 252 (1968) OF 21 MAY 1968
CALLING ON ISRAEL TO RESCIND ALL MEASURES TO CHANGE THE
STATUS OF JERUSALEM

The Security Council,

Recalling General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967,

Having considered the letter of the Permanent Representative of Jordan on the situation in Jerusalem (S/8560) and the report of the Secretary-General (S/8146),

Having heard the statements made before the Council,

Noting that since the adoption of the above-mentioned resolutions, Israel has taken further measures and actions in contravention of those resolutions,

Bearing in mind the need to work for a just and lasting peace,

Reaffirming that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible,

1. *Deplores* the failure of Israel to comply with the General Assembly resolutions mentioned above ;

2. *Considers* that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, which tend to change the legal status of Jerusalem are invalid and cannot change that status ;

3. *Urgently calls upon* Israel to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action which tends to change the status of Jerusalem ;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION No. 271 (1969) OF 15 SEPTEMBER
1969

NOTING THE UNIVERSAL OUTRAGE AT THE DESECRATION OF THE
AL AQSA MOSQUE AND CALLING ON ISRAEL TO RESCIND ALL
MEASURES TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM

The Security Council,

Grieved at the extensive damage caused by arson to the Holy Al Aqsa Mosque
in Jerusalem on 21 August 1969 under the military occupation of Israel,

Mindful of the consequent loss to human culture,

Having heard the statements made before the Council reflecting the universal
outrage caused by the act of sacrilege in one of the most venerated shrines of man-
kind,

Recalling its resolutions 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968 and 267 (1969) of
3 July 1969 and the earlier General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and
2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967, respectively, concerning measures and
actions by Israel affecting the status of the City of Jerusalem,

Reaffirming the established principle that acquisition of territory by military
conquest is inadmissible,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969) ;
2. *Recognizes* that any act of destruction or profanation of the Holy Places,
religious buildings and sites in Jerusalem or any encouragement of, or connivance
at, any such act may seriously endanger international peace and security ;
3. *Determines* that the execrable act of desecration and profanation of the
Holy Al Aqsa Mosque emphasizes the immediate necessity of Israel's desisting
from acting in violation of the aforesaid resolutions and rescinding forthwith all
measures and actions taken by it designed to alter the status of Jerusalem ;
4. *Calls upon* Israel scrupulously to observe the provisions of the Geneva
Conventions and international law governing military occupation and to refrain
from causing any hindrance to the discharge of the established functions of the
Supreme Moslem Council of Jerusalem, including any co-operation that Council

may desire from countries with predominantly Moslem population and from Moslem communities in relation to its plans for the maintenance and repair of the Islamic Holy Places in Jerusalem ;

5. *Condemns* the failure of Israel to comply with the aforementioned resolutions and calls upon it to implement forthwith the provisions of these resolutions ;

6. *Reiterates* the determination in paragraph 7 of resolution 267 (1969) that, in the event of a negative response or no response, the Security Council shall convene without delay to consider what further action should be taken in this matter ;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow closely the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the Security Council at the earliest possible date.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION No. 2672 A, B, C, D (XXV) OF 8 DECEMBER 1970

RECOGNIZING THAT THE PEOPLE OF PALESTINE ARE ENTITLED TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND CALLING ONCE MORE ON ISRAEL TO TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS FOR THE RETURN OF THE DISPLACED PERSONS.

A

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) and 394 (V) of 2 and 14 December 1950, 512 (VI) and 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957, 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958, 1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959, 1604 (XV) of 21 April 1961, 1725 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, 1856 (XVII) of 20 December 1962, 1912 (XVIII) of 3 December 1963, 2002 (XIX) of 10 February 1965, 2052 (XX) of 15 December 1965, 2154 (XXI) of 17 November 1966, 2341 (XXII) of 19 December 1967, 2452 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968 and 2535 A (XXIV) of 10 December 1969,

Noting the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1969 to 30 June 1970,

1. *Notes with deep regret* that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of Assembly resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern ;

2. *Expresses its thanks* to the Commissioner-General and the staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for their continued faithful efforts to provide essential services for the Palestine refugees, and to the specialized agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees ;

3. *Directs* the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to continue his efforts in

taking such measures, including rectification of the relief rolls, as to assure, in co-operation with the Governments concerned, the most equitable distribution of relief based on need ;

4. *Notes with regret* that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine was unable to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), and requests the Commission to exert continued efforts towards the implementation thereof ;

5. *Directs attention* to the continuing critical financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, as outlined in the Commissioner-General's report ;

6. *Notes with concern* that, despite the commendable and successful efforts of the Commissioner-General to collect additional contributions to help relieve the serious budget deficit of the past year, contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East continue to fall short of the funds needed to cover essential budget requirements ;

7. *Calls upon* all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, particularly in the light of the budgetary deficit projected in the Commissioner-General's report, and therefore urges noncontributing Governments to contribute and contributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions.

B

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, 2341 B (XXII) of 19 December 1967, 2452 C (XXIII) of 19 December 1968 and 2435 C (XXIV) of 10 December 1969,

Taking note of the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1969 to 30 June 1970,

Bearing in mind the letter dated 13 August 1970 from the Secretary-General addressed to States Members of the United Nations or members of specialized agencies,

Concerned about the continued human suffering resulting from the June 1967 hostilities in the Middle East,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 2252 (ES-V), 2341 B (XXII), 2452 C (XXIII) and 2535 C (XXIV) ;

2. *Endorses*, bearing in mind the objectives of those resolutions, the efforts of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to continue to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and in serious need of continued assistance as a result of the June 1967 hostilities ;

3. *Strongly appeals* to all Governments and to organizations and individuals to contribute generously for the above purposes to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and to the other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations concerned.

C

The General Assembly,

Recognizing that the problem of the Palestine Arab refugees has arisen from the denial of their inalienable rights under the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Recalling its resolution 2535 B (XXIV) of 10 December 1969, in which it reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine,

Bearing in mind the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in Articles 1 and 55 of the Charter and more recently reaffirmed in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Recognizes* that the people of Palestine are entitled to equal rights and self-determination, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations ;

2. *Declares* that full respect for the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

D

The General Assembly,

Recalling Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967,

Recalling also its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, 2452 A (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, calling upon the Government of Israel to take effective and immediate steps for the return without delay of those inhabitants who had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities, and 2535 B (XXIV) of 10 December 1969,

Gravely concerned about the plight of the displaced persons,

Convinced that the plight of the displaced persons could best be relieved by their speedy return to their homes and to the camps which they formerly occupied,

Emphasizing the imperative of giving effect to its resolutions for relieving the plight of the displaced persons.

1. *Considers* that the plight of the displaced persons continues since they have not been able to return to their homes and camps ;
2. *Calls once more upon* the Government of Israel to take immediately and without any further delay effective steps for the return of the displaced persons ;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly.



SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION No. 298 (1971) OF 25 SEPTEMBER 1971

DEPLORING THE FAILURE OF ISRAEL TO RESPECT U.N. RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING MEASURES TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM.

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969) and the earlier General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of July 1967 concerning measures and actions by Israel designed to change the status of the Israeli occupied section of Jerusalem,

Having considered the letter of the Permanent Representative of Jordan on the situation in Jerusalem (S/10313) and the reports of the Secretary-General (S/8052, S/8146, S/9149 and Add. 1, S/9537 and S/10124 and Add. 1 and 2), and having heard the statements of the parties concerned on the question,

Reaffirming the principle that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible,

Noting with concern the non-compliance by Israel with the above-mentioned resolutions,

Noting with concern further that since the adoption of the above-mentioned resolutions Israel has taken further measures designed to change the status and character of the occupied section of Jerusalem,

1. *Reaffirms* Security Council resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969) ;
 2. *Deplores* the failure of Israel to respect the previous resolutions adopted by the United Nations concerning measures and actions by Israel purporting to affect the status of the city of Jerusalem ;
 3. *Confirms* in the clearest possible terms that all legislative and administrative actions taken by Israel to change the status of the city of Jerusalem including expropriation of land and properties, transfer of populations and legislation aimed at the incorporation of the occupied section are totally invalid and cannot change that status ;
 4. *Urgently calls upon* Israel to rescind all previous measures and actions and to take no further steps in the occupied section of Jerusalem which may purport to change the status of the City, or which would prejudice the rights of the inhabitants and the interests of the international community, or a just and lasting peace ;
 5. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the President of the Security Council and using such instrumentalities as he may choose, including a representative or a mission, to report to the Security Council as appropriate and in any event within 60 days on the implementation of this resolution.
-

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION No. 2949 (XXVII) OF 8 DECEMBER 1972

EXPRESSING GRAVE CONCERN AT THE CONTINUATION OF THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF ARAB TERRITORIES AND CALLING UPON ALL STATES NOT TO RECOGNIZE CHANGES CARRIED OUT BY ISRAEL IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES AND TO AVOID ACTIONS, INCLUDING AID, THAT COULD CONSTITUTE RECOGNITION OF THAT OCCUPATION

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East",

Having received the report of the Secretary-General of 15 September 1972 on the activities of his Special Representative to the Middle East,

Reaffirming that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 must be implemented in all its parts,

Deeply perturbed that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and General Assembly resolution 2799 (XXVI) of 13 December 1971 have not been implemented and, consequently, the envisaged just and lasting peace in the Middle East has not been achieved,

Reiterating its grave concern at the continuation of the Israeli occupation of Arab territories since 5 June 1967,

Reaffirming that the territory of a State shall not be the object of occupation or acquisition by another State resulting from the threat or use of force,

Affirming that changes in the physical character or demographic composition of occupied territories are contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as to the provisions of the relevant applicable international conventions,

Convinced that the grave situation prevailing in the Middle East constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security,

Reaffirming the responsibility of the United Nations to restore peace and security in the Middle East in the immediate future,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolution 2799 (XXVI) ;

2. *Deplores* the non-compliance by Israel with General Assembly resolution 2799 (XXVI), which in particular it called upon Israel to respond favourably to the peace initiative of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East ;

3. *Expresses its full support* for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative ;

4. *Declares once more* that the acquisition of territories by force is inadmissible and that, consequently, territories thus occupied must be restored ;

5. *Reaffirms* that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East should include the application of both the following principles :

(a) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict ;

(b) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and its right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force ;

6. *Invites* Israel to declare publicly its adherence to the principle of non-annexation of territories through the use of force ;

7. *Declares* that changes carried out by Israel in the occupied Arab territories in contravention of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are null and void, and calls upon Israel to rescind forthwith all such measures and to desist from all policies and practices affecting the physical character or demographic composition of the occupied Arab territories ;

8. *Calls upon* all States not to recognize any such changes and measures carried out by Israel in the occupied Arab territories and invites them to avoid actions, including actions in the field of aid, that could constitute recognition of that occupation ;

9. *Recognizes* that respect for the rights of the Palestinians is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East ;

10. *Requests* the Security Council, in consultation with the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, to take all appropriate steps with a view to the full and speedy implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), taking into account all the relevant resolutions and documents of the United Nations in this connexion ;

11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council and the General Assembly on the progress made by him and his Special Representative in the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and of the present resolution ;

12. *Decides* to transmit the present resolution to the Security Council for its appropriate action and requests the Council to keep the General Assembly informed.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 339 (1973)

ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 1748TH MEETING,
ON 23 OCTOBER 1973

The Security Council,

Referring to its resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973,

1. *Confirms* its decision on an immediate cessation of all kinds of firing and of all military action, and urges that the forces of the two sides be returned to the positions they occupied at the moment the cease-fire became effective ;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take measures for immediate dispatch of United Nations observers to supervise the observance of the cease-fire between the forces of Israel and the Arab Republic of Egypt, using for this purpose the personnel of the United Nations now in the Middle East and first of all the personnel now in Cairo.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 340 (1973)

ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 1750TH MEETING
ON 25 OCTOBER 1973

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 333 (1973) of 22 October and 339 (1973) of 23 October 1973,

Noting with regret the reported repeated violations of the cease-fire in non-compliance with resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973),

Noting with concern from the Secretary-General's report that the United Nations military observers have not yet been enabled to place themselves on both sides of the cease-fire line,

1. *Demands* that immediate and complete cease-fire be observed and that the parties return to the positions occupied by them at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October 1973 ;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General, as an immediate step, to increase the number of United Nations military observers on both sides ;

3. *Decides* to set up immediately under its authority a United Nations Emergency Force to be composed of personnel drawn from States Members of the United Nations except the permanent members of the Security Council, and requests the Secretary-General to report within 24 hours on the steps taken to this effect ;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council on an urgent and continuing basis on the state of implementation of the present resolution, as well as resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973) ;

5. *Requests* all Member States to extend their full co-operation to the United Nations in the implementation of the present resolution, as well as resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973).

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 344 (1973)

ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 1760TH MEETING,
ON 15 DECEMBER 1973

The Security Council,

Considering that it decided by its resolution 338 (1973) of 21/22 October 1973 that talks among the parties to the Middle East conflict for the implementation of resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 should be held under "appropriate auspices",

Noting that a Peace Conference on the Middle East situation is to begin shortly at Geneva under the auspices of the United Nations,

1. *Expresses* the hope that the Conference will make speedy progress towards the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East ;
 2. *Expresses* its confidence that the Secretary-General will play a full and effective role at the Peace Conference, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and that he will preside over its proceedings, if the parties so desire ;
 3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep it suitably informed of the developments in negotiations at the Peace Conference in order to enable the Council to review the problems on a continuing basis ;
 4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance and facilities for the work of the Conference.
-

Lamp No. 701

STOCKY CORNER

STOCKY CORNER

STOCKY CORNER

STOCKY CORNER

STOCKY CORNER

STOCKY CORNER

STOCKY CORNER

STOCKY CORNER

STOCKY CORNER

STOCKY CORNER

